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I. INTRODUCTION.
At first men had no kings save the gods, and no government save theocracy. They
reasoned like Caligula, and. at that period, reasoned aright. It takes a long time for
feeling so to change that men can make up their minds to take their equals as
master, in the hope that they will profit by doing so.
From the mere fact that God was set over every political society, it followed that
there were as many gods as peoples. Two peoples that were strangers the one to
the other, and almost always enemies, could not long recognize the same master:
two armies giving battle could not obey the same leader. National division thus
led to polytheism, and this in turn gave rise to theological and civil intolerance,
which, as we shall see hereafter, are by nature the same. 1
Throughout world history the conflict between religious groups has been one of the
major battlegrounds for the social and cultural development of countries. The crusades in
the early Middle Ages, the persecution of the religious dissenters throughout Europe in
the 15
th
and 16th Century and the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis from 1935-45 are
only a few examples of how fatal and dangerous the consequences are when religion is
too closely related to the government. Because the attitudes of the different religions
towards each other are mainly hostile, even armed conflicts are not rare. The war in
Yugoslavia, for example, broke out because of the different religious beliefs of Serbs and
Croatians. Followers of the Dalai Lama are persecuted by the Chinese government, and
the French government has held the activities of Scientology to be criminal acts." In all
these cases the government is not neutral towards the religious groups, but favors or
discriminates against a certain religion. A religiously neutral government, on the other
hand, would decrease the conflicts between the different religious groups within its
countrv.
Jean Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract 298 (G.D.H. Cole trans.. Everyman 2d ed. 1998).
See Peter Gruber, Religionsfreiheit. FOCUS. December 15. 1998 at 246-249.
Unfortunately this strict neutrality is almost impossible to reach and most countries
that have adopted such a principle still face religious conflicts. However, these conflicts
have shifted from armed conflicts to legal conflicts and battles of words, which offer at
least a more peaceful way to fight. One major battleground for these religious conflicts
concerns the role of religion in the public school system. That battleground is the subject
of this paper.
My discussion of how religion should be treated in the public school system will be
based on a comparison between Germany and the United States. While the United States
adheres to the principle of strict separation of church and state, the German Basic Law
has connected church and state in some respects. A comparison of how both countries
deal with religious freedom in public school will thus enable the reader to decide for
himself which of the two systems balances the religious freedom of the school children
and the proper interests of the state in a better way.
Before considering the role of religion in public schools it is necessary to provide
some basic background about the relationship between religion and state in both
countries. This background will be provided for the United States in part II and for
Germany in part III.
Part IV will focus on the main topic, the role of religion in public schools. After
offering a brief summary of the school systems in both countries. Part IV offers a
comparative account of American and German law on three main issues: (1) prayer in
public schools, (2) the use of religious symbols in public schools, and (3) the free
exercise rights of teachers in public schools.
The last part of the paper, Part V, explores historical, textual and sociological reasons
that explain the differing approaches to religion in the public school systems of both
countries. It also addresses the basic question whether the United States or Germany has
developed a better approach to protect religious freedom in public schools.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED
STATES.
A. Overview.
1. U.S. Constitutional Protection Of Religion.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ....'' This short and simple opening passage of the First
Amendment contains the two major principles that guarantee religious freedom in the
United States. The first clause is commonly referred to as the "Establishment Clause,"
and it provides freedom from government interference in religious matters. In contrast,
the second clause protects the individual's freedom of religious belief and practice. It is
generally referred to as the "Tree Exercise Clause." The First Amendment, thus, provides
dual protections: it guarantees government neutrality towards religion and the
individual's liberty in choosing and practicing a religion.
Aside from the First Amendment, only Article VI of the U.S. Constitution is directly
related to religion. Section 3 of Article VI prohibits the use of religious tests as a
requirement for the "Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States."' On its face, this section applies only to the federal government. If the states
attempted to apply such tests for their public offices, however, such state action would
3
U.S. Const, amend. I.
For the purpose of this paper this provision is not relevant. As a result. 1 will retrain from further analysis of Article
VI. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §14-2. at 1 155 n. 1 (2d ed. 1988). for a more intensive
analysis of article IV of the United States Constitution.
5
U.S. Const, art. VI, § 3.
clearly violate the First Amendment. 6 Requiring religious tests for public offices is
therefore unconstitutional for both federal and state governments.
2. Applicability Of The First Amendment To The States
The commands of the First Amendment are directed exclusively to the U.S. Congress.
Therefore, one might assume that only the federal government is bound by them. Indeed,
for a long time, judicial protection under the First Amendment was only applied to
actions of the national government. The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts
simply rejected cases in which actions by state governments were challenged on the basis
that they would violate the First Amendment.
o
,
Beginning in 1925 with Gitlow v. New York, however, the Supreme Court applied
First Amendment protections of freedom of speech and press to the states based on the
incorporation of those freedoms into the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 Two years earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska w the Court had held that the
Fourteenth Amendment should also protect the freedom "to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience."" In 1940 the Court explicitly stated that the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment applied to the states. 12 and. seven years later, the
Court explicitly incorporated the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
See Torcaso v. Watkins. 367 U.S. 488 ( 1961 ) (invalidating a state constitutional provision requiring the declaration
of a belief in God as a qualification for public office).
7
See Alpheus Thomas Mason & williamm. beaney. American constitutional law 516(6lh ed. 1978) ("The
Justices were not yet willing to become censors of state legislation").
Gitlow v. New York. 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press are
among the fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
9
Id. at 666.
10 Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923): See generally Walz v. Tax Commission. 397 U.S. 664. 701-703 (1970)
(Douglas. J., dissenting) (providing a vers detailed description of the incorporation process).
"Wat 399.
~ See Cantwell \. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a state statute that required a permit for solicitors for
religious or charitable reason).
See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,15 (1947) ("There is every reason to give the same application and
broad interpretation to the "establishment of religion" clause").
In all of the following decisions, the Court regularly applied the two First
Amendment clauses to the states. Today, it is no longer questioned that the states are
bound by the religious guarantees of the First Amendment just like the national
government.
14
B. The Establishment Clause.
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . ." But what kind of law would constitute such an
"establishment"? Does the clause only prohibit the government from establishing a
certain religion, or is it sufficient that the government action favors or discriminates
against a certain religion? And, what if the government favors or disfavors all religions?
One of the most difficult issues to resolve with respect to the Establishment Clause has
been how to define the term "establishment." Consequently, before analyzing the
different doctrines the Supreme Court has used to determine Establishment Clause
violations, it is necessary to give the term "establishment" a clearer and more
understandable meaning.
1. What Is "Establishment"?
The First Amendment does not define the non-establishment principle in a detailed
manner. Because there are no "precisely stated constitutional prohibitions" in this area,
the Supreme Court must "draw lines" to define the scope of protection of the
Establishment Clause. 1 "' The Court has done so in part by relying on historical documents
that tend to reveal the framers" intent in enacting the First Amendment.
14
See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda. Constitutional Law § 1 7.3. at 1222 (5 th ed. 1995) [hereinafter:
Nowak/Rotunda] ("Although the original understanding of the drafters of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments
may be unclear, a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court during the past 50 years consistently has held that the
values protected by the religious clauses are fundamental aspects of liberty in our societ) and must be protected from
both state and federal interference.") (footnote omitted).
15 Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602. 612 (1971).
Probably the most clear and intensive historical analysis was undertaken in Everson v.
Board of Education}
6
In this case the Court was faced with the question whether a
government subsidy for the bus transportation of parochial school children to their
schools would constitute an "establishment of religion" under the First Amendment. In
order to define the meaning of "establishment," Justice Black, writing for the majority,
analyzed the historical reasons for enacting the Establishment Clause. Many of the early
settlers who came to the United States had feared or experienced the danger of religious
persecution in Europe. They did not. however, try to avoid these dangers by separating
the church from the state. The religious sects maintained "[the] absolute power and
religious supremacy'* they had had in Europe in the new colonies and, as a result,
religious persecution and the payment of taxes for church support were present in almost
even,' colony. These practices raised concerns and protests among some "freedom-
loving colonials." This protest finally led to the enactment of the Virginia Bill of
Religious Liberties, a document that prohibited religious persecution and taxation for
church support. 18 The author of the Virginia Bill of Religious Liberties, Thomas
Jefferson, was mainly influenced by James Madison and his Memorial and Remonstrance
against the law. a document that was mainly addressed against Virginia's tax law which
allowed the levy of taxes for church support. The Court in Everson found that because
Jefferson and Madison had leading roles in the drafting and adoption of the Virginia
Bill of Religious Liberties as well as later in United States Constitution, the objectives
and goals of the two documents must have at least been similar or even the same. 20 The
10
Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
" Id. at 8-11.
18
Hening. Statutes of Virginia 84 ( 1 823 ); Commager, Documents of American History 125(1 944).
Historical documents show that Jefferson was not present at the time of the drafting and enactment of the United
States Constitution. His influence in the drafting and adoption of the Constitution can therefore only be seen in his
previous documents and writings, such as the Virginia Bill of Religious Liberties. See 16 The new encyclopedia
Britannica323 (15 ,h ed. 1994).
20
Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1. 13 ( 1947 )( referring to prior Court decisions which confirm the holding).
Court finally concluded that, according to all three documents, the Establishment Clause
should "mean[] at least'* that:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go or remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can. openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to errect a
wall of separation between church and State." 1
According to this definition the Establishment Clause prohibits much more than the
creation of a church or a religion by the government. It potentially prohibits almost every
government action that has an impact on religion. In Everson itself, however, the Court
also said that the non-establishment principle "does not require the state to be [the]
adversary"" of religion. Instead, the Establishment Clause requires the state to be as
neutral as possible towards religion and religious practices. "State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor religion.""" This attitude is best
described by the term "strict separation,'" which requires the government to be as neutral
as possible in order to maintain the "wall of separation** that was intended by the Framers
of the Constitution. It is important not to confuse this strict separation with strict
neutrality. Under the latter concept "government would be forbidden to utilize religion as
a standard for action or inaction because the religious clauses prohibit classification in
21
Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).
22 Id at 18.
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." The Supreme Court
has never adopted this concept, mainly because of its incompatibility with the Free
Exercise Clause. 2 ^ Under the concept of strict neutrality, government would not be
permitted to grant religious exemptions, which are, however, sometimes authorized, and
perhaps even mandated, by the Free Exercise Clause.
26
Certainly, the Court has narrowed
the opportunity to obtain religious exemptions from generally applicable laws in
77
Employment Division, Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith (Smith II), but it has
not totally given up the possibility of religious exemptions. The Court in Smith II
recognized at least a possible free exercise right to constitutionally mandated exemptions
7fi •
in two areas." It also observed: "But to say that a nondiscriminatory- religious-practice
exemption is permitted, or even desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required."
2 }
According to the Court, the question whether an exemption should be
granted or not is left to the government. Thus, the holding in Smith II does not indicate an
approach of the Court towards strict neutrality.
As we will see, over the years, the Court has moved away from the principle of strict
separation towards a more open approach of neutrality and accommodation between
24
Tribe, supra note 4. §14-7, at 1 188 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
25
Tribe, supra note 4, § 14-7, at 1 1 89.
26
See Wallace v. Jafifree. 472 U.S. 38. 82 (1985) (O'Connor, J„ concurring) ("It is difficult to square any notion of
complete neutrality with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that government must sometimes exempt a religious
observer from an otherwise generally applicable obligation") (emphasis omitted): McDaniel v. Paty. 435 U.S. 618, 639
( 1978) (Brennan. J., concurring) ("Government may take religion into account when necessary ... to exempt, when
possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would
otherwise thereby be infringed . . . ."); See generally Tribe, supra note 4, §14-7 at 1 188-89 (providing a more detailed
analysis of the concept of strict neutrality).
27
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding the denial of
unemployment benefits to a drug cousellor who was fired because his drug consumption at a religious ceremony); See
infra Part II.C.2.b.iii., for an more detailed analysis of Smith II.
28
Id. at 877 (referring to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). a case in which the Court held that government may
mot regulate "religious belief as such") and id. at 881 (referring to Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a case
which involved not only the Free Exercise Clause but also "other constitutional protections").
29
Id. at 890.
30
church and state. Nonetheless the Court still frequently refers to the basic definition of
establishment created by the Court in Everson? x
2. The Judicial Doctrines Developed In Establishment Clause Cases.
The "wall of separation" constructed in Everson cannot be an absolute one.
Otherwise, government would not even be allowed to provide police or fire protection to
religious institutions, an idea which the Court expressly rejected in Zorach v. Clauson.
Thus, in all Establishment Clause cases, the Court has to draw lines between government
actions that constitute an establishment and those that do not. In order to perform this
task the Supreme Court has established a variety of doctrines that have shifted over
time.
33
a. Strict Separation (1947-1 970).
iA
The doctrine of strict separation was first applied by the Supreme Court in Everson v.
Board of Education. ? Everson. a taxpayer in New Jersey, challenged a state statute that
allowed school boards to subsidize bus transportation of parochial school students/
6 The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts to the effect that the statute did
not violate the First Amendment. Even though there has to be a "high and impregnable"
wall of separation between church and state, the statute did not breach this wall,
See infra Part II.B.2.a. and b. The change in the interpretation of establishment is closely related to the doctrinal
change in the Court's jurisdiction.
31
See e.g.. Walz v. Tax Commission. 397 U.S. 664. 668 (1970); Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38. 53 n.37 (1985);
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union. 492 U.S. 573. 591(1989); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587
(1992).
J
" Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306. 312 (1952); See also infra Part Il.B.2.b.ii. (explaining in more detail the reasons
for which the Court found that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit the denial of generally available public
services to religious institutions or practitioners).
" The Court has only decided a few cases concerning the freedom of religion prior to 1947. The analysis of the
doctrines in this paper will therefore only cover the doctrines established after 1947. See Nowak/Rotunda, supra note
I4,§17.7, at 1290-92. for an analysis of the cases prior to 1947.
The dates in parentheses are only rough indications.
35
Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
36
Id. at 3-5.
37 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 28 1-82 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
10
according to the Court. The Court reasoned that the New Jersey statute was not meant to
advance religion in any way but to provide general benefits '"to all its citizens regardless
of their religious belief" since transportation benefits were provided to public and
private school children alike. Denying these benefits solely to students of parochial
schools would create a disadvantage for these students in relation to other students. Some
of the students would be forced to choose another school simply because of the denial of
these benefits. As a consequence it would become more difficult for church schools to
operate. To produce such an effect, the Court concluded, was "obviously not the purpose
of the First Amendment." The governing principle required the government to be
neutral towards religion, and here that principle was not violated, particularly because the
money was provided directly to the parents and not to any school. Holding that the
"legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools,'" the Court found that the statute did not constitute an establishment of religion
by the government. 41
In later cases, the doctrine of strict separation was applied by the Court to decide
several cases that involved time release programs in public schools.
4
" In order to give
students time for religious education, some public schools had granted students time
away from school classes during the regular school day. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, J the Court held such a program to be unconstitutional because the
public school building itself was "used for the dissemination of religious doctrines" and
because the public school provided the pupils for this program "through the use of the
38
Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1. 16 ( 1947).
39 Wat 18.
42
Illinios ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203. 206 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306
(1952).
43
Illinois ex rel. McCollum. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
11
State's compulsory public school machinery."
44 Once again the Court reaffirmed the
principle of strict separation: "The First Amendment rests upon the premise that both
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from
the other within its respective sphere.
"
4:> Only four years later, in Zorach v. Clausen,
however, the Court upheld a time release program. This decision did not overrule
McCollum. Instead Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found that the facts in
Zorach were distinguishable from the facts in McCollum, so that the latter was not a
binding precedent. ' Unlike in McCollum, the religious instruction in Zorach took place
outside the public school buildings and no government funds or other support were used
to finance this religious activity'. All costs were paid by the religious organizations.
Although the First Amendment "reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be
separated,"'
49
the Court found the program in Zorach to be consistent with this principle
of separation because it did not constitute "a law respecting the establishment of religion
within the meaning of the First Amendment. ,,f ' According to the Court the First
Amendment did not require a strict separation in "every and all respects." but "frjather . .
. defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concern or union or
dependency one on the other."" Therefore government can encourage religious
46
Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 3 1 5 ("We cannot expand it [the McCollum Case] to cover the present released time program . . ."). Justice
Jackson, one of the three dissenters, on the other hand, found the distinction between the two cases "'trivial, almost to
the point of cynicism." Id. at 325. Instead, just like the two other dissenters, he pointed out that the two cases were
very similar and comparable. Both programs did not offer an active alternative for non-believers. Both programs bore
the risk of discriminating against those religions that did not participate in the program and in both programs it was in
the discretion of the school officials to choose which religions were allowed to participate. Id. at 320, 325.
48
Id. at 308-09.
™Id. at 312 ("There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and
State should be separated.").
Id ax 312. Because of this more open approach towards religious accommodation Zorach is sometimes seen as the
beginning of the accommodation approach. Such an interpretation of Zorach is not correct because the Court
reaffirmed the principle of strict separation several times in this decision. See David Felsen, Comment: Developments
in approaches to the Establishment Clause analysis: Consistencyfor the future. 38 Am. U.L. Rev. 395. 402 n. 48
(1989).
51
Id at 3 12.
12
instruction as long as it does not finance or provide religious instruction by its own
agencies or in its own institutions, and as long as government acts neutrally towards
religion, in the sense that it does not favor one religious belief over another. " Because
the religious instruction was not held by public school teachers on public school property
and because the costs were paid by religious organizations, the Court concluded that the
degree of accommodation of religion in Zorach was not prohibited by the First
Amendment."
The most important cases under the strict separation doctrine were decided by the
Court in the years 1962 and 1963. In 1962. in Engel v. Vitale,
54
the Court invalidated a
New York statute that required public schools to have a non-denominational prayer at the
beginning of each school day. One year later, in School District ofAbington Township v.
Schempp 5 ' the Court banned the practice of Bible readings in public schools for religious
reasons/ In Engel, Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion, relied on historical
evidence to conclude that "ft] he First Amendment . . . tried to put an end to government
control of religion and of prayer." 5 By composing an official school prayer the
government had violated this fundamental purpose for the enactment of the
Establishment Clause and thus breached the wall of separation between church and
CD
state." In Schempp the Court expressly held that the First Amendment places the
government in a position of neutrality which "stems from a recognition of the teachings
of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and
52
Id. at 314.
53
Id. at 314-15.
54
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
5
- School District of Abington Township v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
"The Court did not hold that the reading of the Bible for historical reasons would also be prohibited. See id. at 225-
226. Nevertheless, because the assumption that the Bible reading was done for religious purposes is relatively
convincing it would be very difficult to prove that the Bible was only read for historical reasons.
57
Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421. 435 (1962).
Id. at 424; see also id. at 443 (Douglas. J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he First Amendment leaves the government
in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality" and that a government composed prayer would violate this
principle because it would enforce religious practice).
13
religious functions . . . ,"
59
In order to be considered neutral, government action has to
have a secular purpose. Additionally, it must create a primarily neutral effect, meaning
that the government's action must neither advance nor discriminate against religion.
The Court found that by requiring the reading of a verse from the Holy Bible or the
recitation of the Lord's Prayer, the statutes at issue were enacted to advance religion,
without any secular legislative intent. Hence, the statutes clearly breached the principle of
neutrality. Moreover, the Court observed:
[I]t is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively
minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of neutrality that
is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent and . . .
it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.
In conclusion, it appears that the Court espoused the principle of strict separation
between church and state for over 20 years. At the same time the Court realized that at
least in some areas, a total separation of church and State was not possible to achieve. As
a result, from 1947 to 1970 the Court did not commit to one specific criterion upon which
to determine the line of separation between church and state, but rather decided the
Establishment Clause cases on a case by case basis.6 This ad hoc approach to strict
separation led to perceptions of inconsistencies in the resulting body of law.
Responding to these perceptions, the majority,64 beginning with Schempp and Engel
developed two unifying criteria for evaluating Establishment Clause cases which focused
on the purpose and the effect of the challenged government action. These two
59
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203. 215, 222 (1963).
60
Id. at 222.
61
Id. at 225 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
62 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664. 668 (1970).
63
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 343 U.S. 306, 322-323 (Frankfurter. J., dissenting); Engel v.
Vitale. 370 U.S. 421. 442 (Douglas, J., concurring).
64
See Walz v. Tax Commission. 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) ("The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of
the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been to sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that
seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles.").
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considerations, together with a third one. developed in Walz v. Tax Commission,65 were
merged into the three-part Lemon test in 1971. 66
b. The Lemon Test (1970s-1990s).
Although the Court had emphasized several criteria in assessing Establishment
Clause challenges before 1971, the Court did not expressly tie these doctrines together in
one single test until Lemon v. Kurtzman. Beginning with Lemon, however, the Court's
newly invented three-part test was used to decide almost all of the Establishment Clause
cases until the early 1990s.
68
In Lemon, the Court struck down two statutes that provided financial aid to church-
related schools. Both statutes sponsored the teaching of secular subjects in religious
schools by allowing the state to either pay money directly to the teacher69 or by having
the state reimburse the schools for their actual expenses for teachers and textbooks.
Delivering the opinion for the majority. Chief Justice Burger began with an overview of
the previous decisions in which the Court had developed three different tests to determine
Establishment Clause violations. He combined these criteria into one single test that a
statute had to pass in order to be in line with the Establishment Clause: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion: finally, the statute must not foster
65 Walz v. Tax Commission. 397 U.S. 664. 674 (1970).
See Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602 (1971 ) (establishing the three-part test to determine Establishment Clause
violations).
67
See Lemon \. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602. 657-58 (1971) (Brennan. J., concurring) ("The common ingredient of the
three prongs of the test setforth at the outset of this opinion is . . . .") (emphasis added).
68
In several cases however the Court did not apply the Lemon test. E.g. Larson v. Valente 456 U.S. 783 (1983); Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Count) of Alleghen\ v. American Civil Liberties Union. 492 U.S. 109 (1989).
69 Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602. 607 ( 1971 ) (The Rhode Island Statute).
70
Id. at 609 (The Pennsylvania Statute).
71
In the mid 1980s, the Court expanded the application of the Lemon test to any governmental practice. See
Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (stating that "to satisfy the
Establishment Clause a governmental action must . . . ."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 464 U.S. 668. 680 ( 1984) (citing cases in
which the Court has "invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was
lacking").
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79
an excessive government entanglement with religion." The statutes at issue in the case
violated the third prong, because "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising
under the statute in each state involve[d] excessive entanglement between government
and religion." " In Rhode Island the sole beneficiary was the Roman Catholic elementary
school which, according to the Court, had a "substantial religious character" and the
governmental support provided by the statute would necessarily have led to an excessive
entanglement of government with religion. In order to ensure that the governmental
money was only given to teachers for teaching plainly secular subjects it would have been
necessary for the government to supervise and to inspect the teacher and the way he holds
his classes in a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuous*" way. ? "These
prophylactic contacts" the Court argued, "will involve excessive and enduring
entanglement between state and church."' Because the educational system in
Pennsylvania was "very similar to the one existing in Rhode Island," the Court found that
. 77
this statute also fostered an excessive entanglement between government and religion.
Thus, since both statutes already failed the third prong of the Lemon test. Chief Justice
Burger saw the need neither to examine the legislative intent nor to decide whether the
statute's primary effect was to advance religion. 78 Later cases, however, clarified the
meaning of both the purpose and the effects prongs, as well as the prohibition on
excessive government entanglement.
72 Lemon v. kurtzman, 403 U.S.602. 632 (1971).
' Id. at 613 (emphasis omitted.).
74
Id. at 616-17.
75
Id. at 6 19.
76 Mat 6 19.
77
Id. at 620-21.
78
Id. at 613-14.
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i. Secular Purpose.
To avoid a conflict with the Establishment Clause, the governmental action must
have a clear secular purpose.
79
The term "secular" has been interpreted by the Court very
fin
broadly. A narrow interpretation, allowing purposes to be deemed secular only if they
01
neither help nor hinder religion, would make almost even,' governmental action invalid.
To decide whether the purpose is secular, Justice O'Connor suggests that the decision
should be made from the viewpoint of an "objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the [challenged] statute." " The Court itself has
generally followed this way of determining the statute's purpose. ~ In Board ofEducation
v. Allen, for example, the Court considered a statute that required local public school
authorities to lend textbooks for free to all students, regardless of the kind of school they
were attending. This statute was said to have a clearly secular purpose, namely the
"furtherance of the educational opportunities available to the young."
85
It is not sufficient for the government just to assert a secular purpose. On the contrary,
the Court may question the asserted purpose and reach its own conclusion whether the
state's actual purpose is secular or not. Indeed, there are cases in which the Court has
79
See Board of Education v. Allen. 392 U.S. 236. 243 (1968) (upholding a statute that allowed local school boards to
loan textbooks to non-public schools. The underlying governmental purpose, "the furtherance of educational
opportunities available to the young", was considered to be a clearly secular legislative purpose).
Professor Laurence H. Tribe points out that the Court in Corporation ofthe Presiding Bishop ofthe Church ofJesus
Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Amos even has "suggested that the purpose inquiry does not demand that the law's
purpose must be unrelated to religion. Instead, the requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental
decisionmaker from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in
religious matters." Tribe, supra note 4. §14-9. at 1212 (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). Professor Tribe
criticizes this interpretation as "going too far" and, instead, prefers Justice O'Connor's "objective observer" approach.
See id- §14-9, at. 1212.
$i
See Tribe, supra note 4, §14-9, at 1205 (giving the example of laws against murder which would violate the fifth
commandment of the Mosaic Decalogue).
82
Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38. 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83
See Tribe, supra note 4, § 1 4-9. at 1 205.
84
Board of Education v. Allen. 392 U.S. 239 (1969).
85
Id at 243.
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invalidated a law because it lacked a clear secular purpose, even though the government
explicitly asserted one.
In conclusion, the "purpose test" asks whether the challenged action was mainly
motivated by a secular goal or if its purpose was solely "to endorse or disapprove of
religion.** If the action clearly lacks a secular purpose or if it is obviously only intended
to advance or to disfavor religion, it is considered to be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. 88
ii. Neutral Primary Effect
Closely related to the secular purpose test is the second part of the Lemon test.
Government must not only have a clear secular purpose for its actions, but its actions
must also have a neutral primary effect on religion. The distinction between the first
prong and the second involves the question of government's underlying intention for the
action. Under the first prong if the government intends to affect religion, the challenged
action is invalid.
89
The second test, in contrast, looks at the effect the action creates,
whether or not this effect was intended. Thus, even though government has a legitimate
secular purpose, the challenged action will still be unconstitutional if it creates an either
positive or negative effect on religious groups.
86 See Epperson v. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 97 ( 1968) (invalidating a statute that prohibited the teaching of evolution in
public schools. As there were no records about the reasons tor the statute's enactment, the Court concluded that the
law was enacted to protect certain religious beliefs and without any secular purpose); Stone v. Graham. 449 U.S. 39,
41( 1980) (invalidating a statute that required the posting of the Ten Commandments in the public schools, based on
the conclusion that the posting of the Ten Commandment, as a "sacred text", lacked a secular purpose but was "plainly
religious"): Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38. 56 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama statute which required a moment of
silence for prayer in public school at the beginning of each school day. because the statute was not motivated by any
clearly secular purpose).
87
Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (O'Connor. J., concurring).
In the cases, in which the Court has not extensively analyzed the governmental purpose, the challenged action
always failed at least one of the other two prongs of the Lemon test. Thus, there was no need to intensify the inquiry
into the purpose of the challenged action when it was easier for the Court to determine the violation of the other parts
of the Lemon test. See Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602. 614 ( 1971 ).
Of course this would also be a violation of the second prong of the Lemon test. See Tribe, supra note 4, §14-10,at
1215 ("[A]ny non-secular [has to) be remote, indirect and incidental.").
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The question that arises under the second prong of Lemon is how to define "primary
neutral effect." Does the word "neutral" mean that there must be no effect at all on
religion? Such an interpretation would go too far for, as we have seen, a total separation
between church and state is impossible to attain.90 Many governmental actions, such as
the regulation of building and zoning and the provision of police and fire protection, have
an effect on religion even though the effect is unintentional. ' A principle that denies
generally available public services to religious institutions or practitioners would not only
conflict with the Free Exercise Clause; it would be impossible to implement. How, for
example, could a policemen, helping an old women to cross the street, know if she is on
the way to church or to the supermarket?
Having recognized that "some relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable." ~ the Court has not demanded that government action must
have purely secular effects. Instead, the term "primary neutral effect" means that the
secular effects must outweigh the non-secular effects in such a way that the overall effect
is deemed secular. 93
Except for some areas in which the secular and non-secular effects are obvious,
"primary effect" analysis sometimes involves a very intensive and fact-sensitive
analysis. In these types of cases the Court first has to gather all the facts concerning the
90
Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 312 ("The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and ail respects there shall be a separation of
Church and State. Rather it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concern or
union or dependency one on the other . . . Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly").
92
Id. at 312.
93
Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668. 681 ( 1984) (holding that the creche's display had a primary secular effect. The
Court reached this decision by comparing the effects created by the creche display to the effects produced by textbook
loans to parochial schools or by the expenditure of public funds for school bus transportation for parochial school
students. According to the Court, the display of a creche could not have a greater effect on religion than the other
benefits to religion which the Court has found to be non-violative of the Establishment Clause.).
9
" See e.g., Agostini v. Felton. 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding a New York program under which public school
teachers were sent into parochial schools during regular school hours to provide remedial education to disadvantaged
children). In the decision the Court very intensively analyzed whether the program would create the impermissible
effect of advancing religion. See id. at 231-253. See Board of Education v. Allen. 392 U.S. 239. 243-48 (1968); Meek
v. Pittenger421 U.S. 349, 360-73 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229. 236-55 (1977), for further cases in which
the Court has undertaken an intensive analysis of the second prong of the Lemon test.
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possible effects that may arise from the challenged action. In a second step, the Court
weighs these effects against each other in order to find the overall tendency. In Wolman v.
Walter, ' for example, the Court had to decide about the constitutionality of an Ohio
statute that, among other things, authorized the expenditure of public funds to provide
speech, hearing and psychological services in non-public schools. The appellants
argued that the speech and hearing staff and the psychological diagnosticians "might
engage in unrestricted conversation with the pupil and, on occasion, might fail to separate
religious instruction from secular responsibilities" and thus create the effect of advancing
religion. The Court, however, rejected this argument and held that "the provision of
health services to all school children - public and nonpublic - [did] not have the primary
effect of aiding religion. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion, stated that
diagnostic services were not as closely related to the "educational mission of nonpublic
schools" as other core services like teaching or counseling. Hence, he concluded that the
"pressure on the public diagnostician to allow the intrusion of sectarian views [was]
greatly reduced." In addition, the contact between the children and the diagnosticians
was also sufficiently limited that the Court reached the conclusion that providing these
services would "not create the impermissible risk of the fostering of ideological views.
For an effect of government action to matter it is not important whether the effect was
specifically intended by the government or not. The only requirement is that the effect
must be created directly by the government action. 101 Like in the first prong of the Lemon
95 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
96
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242. Concerning the employment situation of the speech and hearing staff the Court noted "that the personnel
(with the exception of physicians) who perform the services are employees of the local board of education; that
physicians may be hired on a contract basis; that the purpose of these services is to determine the pupiFs deficiency or
need of assistance; and that treatment of any defect so found would take place off the nonpublic school premises." Id
at 24 1
.
98
Id at 242.
99
Id. at 244.
100
Id. at 244.
' ' Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos. 48 U.S. 327, 337
( 1987) ("For a law to have forbidden effects under Lemon it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced
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test, the Court has refrained from simply relying on official government statements
concerning possible effects. Instead, especially when the action obviously also created
non-secular effects, the Court has undertaken a more intensive analysis. For example, in
one of its school prayer cases, School District ofAbington Township v. Schempp, " the
Court recognized as a secular effect the achievement of "the promotion of moral values,
the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our time, the perpetuation of [the
American] institutions and the teaching of literature." 10 But in the end the Court
concluded that the non-secular effects of Bible reading without comment clearly
outweighed the practice's admitted secular effects .
In summary, the second prong of the Lemon test asks if the overall effect the
government action will most likely create is a secular or neutral effect. If this is the case,
the challenged action has passed the second test, and the Court will move on to the last
prong of the Lemon test.
iii. No Excessive Government Entanglement.
In Lemon the Court explained:
In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is
excessive, we must examine the character and purpose of the institutions
that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. 1
The third prong of the Lemon test perhaps corresponds most closely with the
Framers* intent in creating the First Amendment. History teaches us that church and state
religion through its own activities and influence .... As the Court observed in Walz, for the men who wrote the
Religion Clause of the First Amendment the establishment of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.").
lo:
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
103
Id. at 223.
104
Id. at 224 ("But even if its purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be accomplished through readings,
without comment, from the Bible.'").
105 Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602. 654 (1971).
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should not interfere in each other's "respective spheres of choice and influence."
Because total separation is impossible, the requirement of non-entanglement necessarily
involves matters of degree. Only when the government interferes in an extensive way
with religion is the action is unconstitutional. But how intense must this entanglement be
to fail this test?
To answer this question it is helpful to distinguish between the different ways in
which government might interfere in religious spheres. Professor Laurence H. Tribe has
identified five different kinds of entanglement.
107 Two of these forms of entanglement are
relevant to the issue of religion in public schools, and this paper will focus on them.
First, government may become entangled with religion when it delegates some of its
power to religious institutions. There can be no doubt that this kind of entanglement is
excessive. To allow such delegations would not only breach the "wall of separation"
between church and state; it would more likely tear it down. It is in the very purpose of
religion that each action motivated by it reflect religious doctrine. The difficulty is that
the exercise of government powers would reflect religious viewpoints if they were
exercised by religious institutions. This outcome would threaten the core purpose of the
First Amendment and the Framers* intent to separate church and state. Thus, the Court
has held that giving churches such a place in the "process of government" would be an
"offensive violation of the spirit of the Constitution." 10
Another category of unconstitutional entanglement is excessive administrative
entanglement.
110
This kind of entanglement may arise when the government intends to
provide aid for a secular purpose. To achieve this goal the government often has no
106
TRIBE, supra note 4. § 1 4- 1 1 . at 1 226.
107
See TRIBE, supra note 4. § ! 4- 1 1 . at 1 226-3 1
.
u8
See Larkin v. GrendePs Den. Inc.. 459 U.S. 1 16 (1982) (striking down a Massachusetts law that granted to
religious institutions the right to veto applications for liquor licenses for sites located within 500 ft. of the institution).
m
Id at 127.
1 10
See Tribe, supra note 4. § 1 4- 1 1 . at 1 228.
22
choice but to monitor the operations of the religious organization. But by doing so the
government interferes with the organization's autonomy. In some cases, government aid
to religious organizations, even though it passes the first two parts of the Lemon test, will
fail the third prong for this reason. On the other hand, there are ways to provide
governmental aid to religious institutions without offending the non-entanglement rule.
Lending textbooks for secular subjects to parochial students and paying subsidies for
their bus transportation to school, for example, are not considered by the Court to create
an extensive entanglement. On the other hand, paying the salaries of the teachers of
secular subjects in parochial schools was considered to be an excessive entanglement
because government officials had to visit the school ~ perhaps extensively ~ to verify
that the subject and the way the teacher taught it were genuinely non-religious.
Of all three parts of the Lemon test, the most criticized part has been the entanglement
test.
113
In his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree,
U4
Justice Rehnquist suggested that
the Court should abandon the Lemon test completely and decide the Establishment
Clause cases in a more restricted way based on the intent of the Framers of the First
Amendment. 115 He agreed with Justice White, who, in his concurrence in Roemer v.
Board of Public Works of Maryland
Ub
pointed out that the entanglement prong created
"an insoluable paradox" when it is separated from its original context. According to
Justice White, this would be true especially in school aid cases. If the government
provides aid to parochial schools, it generally has to supervise the secular use of this aid
111
See generally Wolman \. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (writing for the majority. Justice Blackmun gives a good
overview about the Court's decisions concerning governmental aid to non-secuiar schools).
' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 619 ( 1971 ) ("A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and that the First Amendment
otherwise respected.").
13
See e.g.. Aguilar v. Felton. 473 U.S. 402. 430 (1985) (O'Connor. J., dissenting) (proposing the inclusion of the
entanglement test into the effect test): Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602. 664-71 (1971 ) (White, J., concurring)
(stating that the entanglement test would be only a restatement of the effect test): Roemer v. Board of Public Works of
Maryland. 426 U.S. 736. 769 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (same).
114
Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
115
Id. at 112-13.
" 6 Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland. 426 U.S. 736. 769 (1976) (White. J., concurring).
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in order to pass the effect prong of the Lemon test. This close supervision, however,
frequently creates an excessive entanglement with religion and makes the aid
unconstitutional. According to Justice Rehnquist *'[t]his type of self-defeating result,"
however, is "certainly not required to ensure that states do not establish religions." 117
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, would not "abandon all aspects*' of the Lemon
test, but instead would redefine it. Instead of deciding each case separately, based on
historical and textual evaluation of the First Amendment. Justice O'Connor prefers a
single standard principle that is applicable to all conflicts.
118
In her concurrence in Lynch
v. Donnelly she stated that the standard to determine Establishment Clause violations
should be whether government has endorsed religion. 1 " This endorsement test would
combine the first two criteria of the Lemon test by asking "whether government's purpose
is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of
endorsement." ~ Concerning the third prong of the Lemon test — the excessive
government entanglement inquiry ~ Justice O'Connor found that the factors the Court
has used to determine whether an entanglement is excessive have been the same as the
factors the Court has used to determine whether the effect of the challenged action was
primarily neutral. Hence, she concluded that the excessive entanglement issue should
be treated "as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect." 123
iv. Is The Lemon Test Still Valid?
The Lemon test has encountered severe criticism. The decision itself was not
unanimous, and many subsequent opinions have distinguished Lemon ' or criticized
117
Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38. 1 10 (1985) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting).
118
Id. at 68-69.
119 Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
120
Id. at 687-689.
121
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122
Agostini v. Felton. 521 U.S. 203, 256-57 (1997).
123
Id. at 257.
124
See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993); Stone v. Graham.
449 U.S. 39. 40 (1980): Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland. 426 U.S. 736, 749 (1976).
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it.
1 ?
Justice O'Connor, for example, has said that a strict application of the test "may
sometimes do more harm than good." 1 ' 6 Despite widespread criticism, the Lemon test
was cited by the Supreme Court in "virtually all Establishment Clause cases between the
early 1970s and the 1990s.*" 12 ' However, in the late 80*s and early 90"s. without expressly
rejecting or overruling the Lemon test, the Court started to move away from applying
it.
128
Does this mean that the Lemon test has ceased to be valid? The answer must be no.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly abandoned Lemon, and the doctrine of stare
decisis requires the lower courts to take a precedent as binding as long as it has not been
overruled. "[Ojnly the Supreme Court may overrule one of its own precedents and until
such occurs, precedent is still good law** 124
c. Modern Doctrines
In the late 1980s and early 90s the Court seemed to move away from applying the
Lemon test by basing its decisions on two other criteria: ( 1 ) whether the government had
endorsed religion and (2) whether government had coerced religious practice. Not many
Establishment Clause cases have been brought before the Supreme Court since 1990.
however, so that analysis of these two new criteria is basically limited to two major
cases.'
30
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See Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Man land. 426 U.S. 736. 767 (1976).
126
See Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet. 512 U.S. 687. 718 (1994). For further
examples see Tribe,, supra note 4. § 1 7-3. at 1 224 n.4.
127 Nowak/Rotunda. supra note 14. §17.3. at 1223.
128
See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union. 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992): Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District \. Grumet. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
129
See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc." v. Jordan K.Rand. Ltd.. 460 U.S. 533. 535 (1983).
130
See Count) of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). for the "endorsement" test and
Lee v. Weisman. 505 U.S. 573 (1992). for the "coercion" test.
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i. Endorsement Of Religion.
The Supreme Court applied the '"endorsement" test for the first time in 1989 in
County ofAllegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union. In this case the Court had to
decide the constitutionality of a Christmas display. In contrast to its decision in Lynch v.
Donnelly 1 " five years earlier, the Court found the Christmas display violated the
Establishment Clause. 13
Writing for the majority. Justice Blackmun. started with an overview of previous
Establishment Clause cases and the doctrines the Court had applied in these cases.
Concerning the recent cases he found that the Court had "paid particularly close attention
to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of
"endorsing" religion. . . ,"
135
Referring to previous decisions he provided a definition for
endorsement: government action is considered to be endorsing if it "convey[s] or
attempts] to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred."
136
Justice Blackmun then analyzed the logic of Lynch. Finding the "rationale
of the majority opinion in Lynch . . . none too clear."" 1 " 7 he concluded that the
concurrence of Justice O'Connor in that case supplied a "sound analytical framework for
evaluating governmental use of religious symbols." lj8 According to Justice O'Connor
government should be prohibited from any endorsement of religion, because it "send[s] a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
131
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the display of a creche
violated the Establishment Clause).
32
Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding a city's Christmas display that contained aside from a creche
also Santa Clause with his reindeers, and a Christmas tree).
133 County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573. 621 (1989).
134
Id. at 589-593.
136
Id. at 593 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38. 70 (1984) (O'Connor. J., concurring)).
137
Id. at 594.
138
Id. at 595.
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members of the political community." 139 The four dissenters in Lynch had agreed with
Justice O'Connor on the application of the endorsement test. but had come to a
different conclusion when they applied the test. Because five Justices had applied the
criteria of "endorsement" as the decisive element in Lynch, Justice Blackmun in
Allegheny concluded that "government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if
it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of
religious symbols depends on its context." 141 Because the county's display of a creche
was without other secular symbols, but instead was accompanied by a sign saying that the
creche was provided by a Roman Catholic organization, the Court found government
endorsement of religion to be present. The majority's application of the non-endorsement
principle, however, was drawn into question just three years later when Justice Kennedy
wrote for the Court's majority in Lee v. Weisman} 42
ii. Coercion.
In Lee v. Weisman 4 * the Court had to rule on the constitutionality of a non-
denominational prayer that was delivered by a clergy member at a public school
graduation ceremony. While four Justices wanted to uphold this practice, five Justices
found the prayer to be unconstitutional.
144
The five Justices who made up the Court's
majority, reached this result using a variety of analytical techniques.
Justice Kennedy based the majority opinion mainly on the element of coercion that he
found present in this case. The graduation ceremony plays such an important part in a
student's life, that the argument that the students were free to leave the ceremony "lacks
139
Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668. 688 (1984) (O'Connor. J., concurring).
140
Id. at 717 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
141
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573. 597 (1989).
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Lee v. Weisman. 505 U.S. 577 ( 1992).
143
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577 ( 1 992).
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Id. at 579.
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all persuasion" ]A ~ and It rests on "pure formalism;" 146 in reality graduating students were
effectively coerced to participate in religious ceremonies. In addition to this element of
coercion. Justice Kennedy recognized an excessive involvement of the government in the
religious exercise. The graduation ceremony is a public school ceremony, held on school
property, and the prayer had to follow certain guidelines, established by school officials.
According to Justice Kennedy, all these "dominant facts mark and control" the decision
to invalidate the prayer.
The "coercion" test seems to ask whether government directly or indirectly coerces
people to favor a certain religion. In Lee v. Weisman itself, however, four of the Justices
preferred to decide the case on the basis of other criteria. Justice Blackmun, who was
joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens, based his concurrence on the
'"endorsement" test. Moreover, Justice Souter. joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice
Stevens, openly expressed doubts about the "coercion" test by stating that none of the
precedents can "support the position that a showing of coercion is necessary to a
successful Establishment Clause claim." 148 Thus, the importance and relevance of the
"coercion" test in future cases may very well be doubted.
d. Doctrinal Development After Lee v. Weisman.
In the major Establishment Clause cases that followed Lee v. Weisman, the Court has
not based its decision on the Lemon test. 149 In Board of Education ofKiryas Joel Village
149
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist.. 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law that
required the government to provide a sign language interpreter tor a deaf student who attended a parochial school);
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet. 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that New York statute that
created a public school district along the lines of a village in which all inhabitants were members of the Satmar Hasidic
sect would violate the Establishment clause.); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding a New York City
program under which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools to provide remedial instruction for
disadvantaged children).
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School District v. Grumet 150 the Court did not even mention the Lemon test. ' but
instead, based its decision on the principle of government neutrality. "" In the most recent
Establishment Clause case. Agostini v. Felton,
1 ' 3
the Court had to decide about a New
York City program under which public school teachers were sent to parochial schools
during regular school hours to provide remedial education for disadvantaged children. By
a five-to-four vote the Court upheld the program and overruled in principal part its prior
decisions in Aguilar v. Felton ~* and in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball.
Writing for the majority. Justice O'Connor, began with a brief summary of the Court's
holdings in Aguilar and Ball. In both cases one of the major arguments for the
invalidation of the programs has been the danger that the public employees "might subtly
(or overtly) conform their instruction to the pervasively sectarian environment in which
they taught.'"
1 ' b
This proposition, as Justice O'Connor noted in Agostini. had never been
proven. "[T]here [was] no reason to presume that, simply because she enters a parochial
school classroom, a full-time public employee . . . will depart from her assigned duties
and instructions . . . ." 5 Justice O'Connor enumerated the three criteria the Court
'"currently use[s] to evaluate whether governmental aid has the effect of advancing
religion."
8
In order to be consistent with the Establishment Clause governmental aid
|S0
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
' The fact that the Court did not mention Lemon in its decision led Justice O'Connor to conclude that the Court has
departed from using the Lemon test. In her eyes this departure from Lemon was a step forward. Id at 721 . Justice
Blackmun. on the other hand, did not consider the Court's decision in Grumet as a departure from the Lemon test. He
argues that although the Court does not apply the Lemon test it nevertheless refers to decisions which "explicitly rested
on the criteria set forth in Lemon." Id at 710.
152
Id. at 696-97.
153
Agostini v. Felton. 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding a New York City program under which public school teachers
were sent into parochial schools to provide remedial instruction for disadvantaged children).
154
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 ( 1985) (invalidating a program that used federal funds to pay the salaries of public
school teachers who provided remedial instruction to non-public school students).
155
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 ( 1985) (invalidating a released time program that provided
remedial instruction to non-public schools students at public expenses on private school premises and a program that
required government to pay parochial school teachers who taught "community education" in a wholly secular manner
after class in parochial schools) In Agostini the Court only overruled the first program.
156
Id. at 234. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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should not (1) result in governmental indoctrination of religion. (2) define its
beneficiaries based on religion, or (3) create an excessive entanglement with religion.
In Agostini, the Court did not find any of these circumstances to be present and therefore
upheld the program.
In conclusion, the Court has not overruled Lemon. Thus, although the Court has
refrained from applying it during the past 10 years, the Lemon test is basically still
applicable. However, because of all the inconsistencies within the test and the criticism it
has received, it is doubtful whether the Court will ever use the Lemon test again. Justice
O'Connor has said that return to the Lemon test "would likely be futile." 160 In her opinion
a "less unitary approach [would] provide[] a better structure for analysis," 161 by adapting
Establishment Clause analysis to particular contexts in which Establishment Clause
problems arise. 16~ In this light, Agostini can be seen as an attempt to define new criteria
for deciding Establishment Clause cases concerning the constitutionality of governmental
aid to religious schools.
C. The Free Exercise Clause.
1. Overview.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make
no law. . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. 163 The term "free exercise" not only
embraces the freedom to act. but it also encompasses the freedom to believe. 16 Further,
the Free Exercise Clause protects the right of individuals who chose not to believe in any
religion or not to engage in any religious practice because, "just as the right to speak and
159 Wat 261.
16U
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 721 (1994).
161
Id at 721.
162
Id. at 721.
164
Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145. 164 (1879): Cantwell v. Conecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
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the right to refrain from speaking", the right to believe and the right not to believe are
"complementary components." 16 ^
To what extent may the government burden the free exercise of religion? The Court
held in 1879 166 that the freedom to believe is considered to be absolute. Upholding a
Congressional statute that prohibited the practice of polygamy, the Court held that, while
the Free Exercise Clause prevented Congress from interference ''with mere religious
belief," it could well interfere with religious practice.
16
' In Cantwell v. Connecticut,
the Court reaffirmed this distinction and added that religious conduct might be regulated
insofar as the regulations would not unduly "infringe the protected freedom."
Accordingly, some infringement on religious conduct may be allowed, while some is
clearly prohibited. The problem becomes how to draw the line.
2. Judicial Doctrines In Free Exercise Clause Cases.
The best way to draw the line between permissible and impermissible regulation of
religious conduct is to first distinguish between laws that burden religion directly, and
laws that are religiously neutral. The court has developed different doctrines to deal with
these different categories of laws,
170
applying strict scrutiny if the law burdens religion
directly and minimal scrutiny if the law is neutral. The following discussion gives an
overview of the development of these doctrines.
16>
Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38. 52 (1985).
166
Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145. 162 (1879).
167
Id. at 166.
l68
Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a state statute that required a permit for solicitors for
religious or charitable reason).
169
Id. at 304.
170
See generally NowaKj'Rotuuda. supra note 14. § 17.6. at 1278-90 (providing a very good overview over the two
classifications and their treatment by the Court).
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a. Laws That Are Not Religiously Neutral.
Laws that are not religiously neutral are those that encroach on religious belief or
impose burdens on people simply because of their religious beliefs. Such laws
presumptively violate the Free Exercise Clause.
171
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah? 12 for example, the Court invalidated a law that prohibited animal
slaughter. Although the law was in principle generally applicable, it contained so many
exemptions that under the surface it was directed only towards a particular sect. Writing
for the majority. Justice Kennedy noted that "[t]he challenged law had an impermissible
object; and in all events the principle of general applicability was violated because the
secular ends asserted in defense of the law, were pursued only with respect to conduct
motivated by religious beliefs." 1
' 1 As a result, it makes no difference if a law is per se
discriminatory or if it was originally enacted as a generally applicable law with the
purpose of burdening a religion. In both cases the law is unconstitutional. The burden of
proof rests with the person or the group that feels discriminated by the law. They have to
prove that the "legislative purpose was the promotion of religious beliefs or the
suppression of the religious practice of a religious sect."'
4 Such a law is then subject to
strict judicial scrutiny, meaning that, in order to uphold the law, the government must
prove a compelling government interest and that the law is "narrowly tailored to advance
that interest."
1 5
171
See NOWAK/ROTUNDA. supra note 14. § 17.6. at 1278 (noting that "'[a] law would be invalid if the legislature
passed the law prohibiting some type of activity only because of the religious belief displayed by the activity or only
because the government wished to burden a particular religion.").
172 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave. Inc. v. Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
173
Id. at 532.
174 Nowak/Rotunda. supra note 14. § 17.6. at 1278.
175
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye! Inc. v. Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520. 534 (1993).
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b. Religiously Neutral Laws.
Religiously neutral laws are generally applicable laws that only incidentally burden a
certain religious belief or a religious practice. A state statute that required compulsory
school attendance for all children until the age of 16 was such a general applicable law.
The purpose for the state to enact such a statute is certainly not to burden religion, but to
provide children a better education and to foster their "development as citizens and
members of the society.
'
,177
Nevertheless the statute may burden religious groups who
believe that school education after a certain age would be contrary' to their religious
principles. Hence, in this case a law ~ although generally applicable and enacted
without the intend to burden religion — nevertheless conflicts with the religious principles
of the adherents of some religious sects by making it difficult or impossible for them to
comply with the law and their religious beliefs at the same time.
In some cases the Supreme Court has formally distinguished between generally
applicable laws that burden religion directly and laws that burden religion only
indirectly.
179 Many states, for example, prohibit the consumption of drugs. Some
religious sects, however, consume drugs during their religious ceremonies. The
prohibition of drug consumption by law burdens religion directly by making the use of
the drug in the religious ceremony illegal. A law would burden religion indirectly, on the
other hand, if it would make religious exercise more difficult for their practitioners,
instead of "regulating a religiously motivated practice as such."" 1 ' Sunday closing laws.
76
See Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding a state statute unconstitutional that required compulsory
school attendance for Amish school children after the eight grade).
177 Nowak/Rotunda, supra note 14. § 17.8. at 1302.
178
See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court found that the state by mandating further school
education for the Amish children would endanger the fundamental religious principles of the Amish people who lived
their daily lives according to these principles.
179 Nowak/Rotunda. supra note 14. § 17.6, at 1280.
180
See e.g.. Cal. [Health & Safety] § 1 1350 (West 1999); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-40 (Michie 1997); Miss. Code
Ann. § 41-29-139 (1998) (prohibiting the possession of certain drugs).
181 Nowak/Rotunda, supra note 14. § 17,6, at 1280 (adding that religious practice is usually burdened by of imposing
additional economic costs on the practitioners. Faced with these additional costs the believers would probably refrain
from religious practice.).
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for example, indirectly burden Sabbatarians, who refrain from working for religious
reasons on Saturdays. In order to comply with their religious belief Sabbatarians must
close their shops two days a week and thus have to face additional economic costs.
Today, however, the Court applies the same doctrines and guiding principles for
generally applicable laws whether they directly burden religion or indirectly burden
religion.
183
Generally applicable laws cannot be challenged as being unconstitutional with the
argument that they solely favor or disfavor religion. In most cases, instead, the plaintiff
must seek an exemption from the law because of his religious beliefs. In general, the
Court tends to deny such exemptions from generally applicable law. 1 4 Nevertheless,
there have been some cases in which the Court has provided an exemption under the Free
Exercise Clause. The following discussion provides a brief overview of these decisions
and the level of scrutiny the Court has applied in each case.
i. Free Exercise Clause Cases Prior To 1963.
The judicial protection of the free exercise of religion prior to 1963 was relatively
weak, and religious minorities suffered the most from this weakness. For example, the
Court upheld several laws that restricted the practice of the Mormons, especially
polygamy. In the 1940's and 1950's the Court provided more protection to religion.
82
See e.g., McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420 (1961 ) (upholding a state law that required business closures on
Sunday); Braunfeld v. Brown. 366 U.S. 599. 606-07 (1961 ) (upholding Pennsylvania's Sunday Closing law although it
imposed an "indirect burden on religious exercise" because of its legitimate purpose to create a uniform "family day of
rest.").
183 Nowak/Rotitnda, supra note 9, §17.6. at 1280 (stating that "the distinction between direct and indirect burdens
does not have any legal significance").
184
See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Goldman v. Weinberger. 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cementarv Protective Association. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Employment Division Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
185
See. e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1963); Thomas v. Review Board. 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v.
Verner. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
186
See NOWAK/ROTUNDA. supra note 14. § 17.6. at 1281-84, 1290-93.
187
See Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Davis v. Baeson. 133 U.S. 33 (1890); State v. Barlow, 324 U.S.
891 (1945).
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However, the decisions were not or at least not mainly based on the Free Exercise Clause,
but on the right of free speech, also provided by the First Amendment.
ii. Free Exercise Clause Cases From 1963-90.
This era could probably be described best as the "balancing era" because the Court
applied a two step balancing test during this period in order to determine whether a
person had the right to an exemption for her religious beliefs from a generally applicable
law. First, the person had to show that the challenged law actually imposed a burden
on his religious practice. Then, in a second step, the Court required the government to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest for burdening this religious practice and
for not granting an exemption. The Court thus balanced the interest of the government in
not granting an exception with the burden on the free exercise right of the individual.
According to this balancing test,
fa] statute may stand only if the law in general, and the State's refusal to
allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling
interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means. 190
Although this may seem to be an unusually high requirement for the government to
meet, in most of these cases the government interest did outweigh the individual's
burden, and the exemption was denied. 191 In United States v. Lee, 192 for example, the
Court found that the society's interest in having a functioning Social Security system
outweighed the interest of an Amish worker in avoiding contributions to this system
88
See Canwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296 ( 1940) (invalidating a statute that required a permit for solicitors for
religious or charitable reason); West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating a statute
that required students to take part in the daily flag salute at school); See Nowak/Rotunda, supra note 14, § 17.7, at
1292 n.l 1. for further examples.
189
See Nowak/Rotunda. supra note 14. § 17.6. at 1280-83. $17.7. at 1293 (describing the balancing test).
190
Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1992) (Blackmun
J., dissenting).
191
See Nowak/Rotunda, supra note 14. §17.6, at 1290 ("But, during the quarter century in which the Court used that
test, it almost always ruled in favor of the government") (footnote omitted).
192
United States v.' Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
35
because of his religious belief.
19
' The Court reasoned that the reliability and the
functioning of this system depends on the contributions of everybody and that granting
exemptions from these contributions would severely endanger its functioning 194
The Court found the same to be true in taxation cases as well. ^ In fact, there were
only two areas in which the Court granted exemptions from generally applicable laws for
196
religious beliefs. One was the area of compulsory school education for Amish children,
and the other was the area of unemployment compensation. 197
Unemployment regulation statutes frequently deny unemployment benefits to workers
if they leave their jobs voluntarily. The reason for such a regulation is to prevent the
misuse of the system by workers "as a type of paid vacation."'
19g
In Sherbert v. Verner,
the Court for the first time required government to make an exemption for people who
voluntarily refused to work, but whose refusal was genuinely based on their religious
belief. In a series of later unemployment compensation cases the Court continued to
adhere to this rule.
20(
iii. Free Exercise Clause Cases After 1990.
Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, (Smith
II) was decided by the Court in 1990 and makes a sharp break from the Court's earlier
193 Wat 261.
194
Id. at 259.
195
See Nowak/Rotunda. supra note 14. § 17.6. at 1285. for further examples.%
See Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1963) (requiring government to grant an exemption from compulsory
school attendance for Amish children, because of their religious belief)-
97
See e.g.. Sherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (granting unemployment benefits to a worker, who refused to take
an offered job to work on Saturday because of his religious belief).
198
See Nowak/Rotunda. supra note 14. § 17.6. at 1282 (explaining the purpose of this government regulation in
more detail).
99
Sherbert \. Verner, 374 U.S. 398. 420 (1963) (granting unemployment benefits to a worker, who refused to take an
offered job to work on Saturday, because of his religious belief).
00
See also Thomas v. Review Board. 450 U.S. 707 ( 1981 ) (granting unemployment benefits to a person who had quit
a job in a factory making parts for tanks and other weapons for religious reasons); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission of Florida 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that there must be an exception from the general denial of
unemployment benefits if the person loses his job because of his refusal to work on Saturdays).
01
Employment Division .Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. Smith II. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In
Employment Division v. Smith (Smith I). 484 U.S. 660 (1988) the Court had remanded the case to the Supreme Court
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willingness to consider requiring religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.
Smith was employed as a drug counsellor with a private drug rehabilitation facility.' He
was fired because of consumption of peyote. a narcotic, at a religious ceremony. Since he
lost his job for "good reason.'* the Employment Division Department denied the payment
of unemployment benefits. 20 ' The Supreme Court upheld the denial on the ground that,
by using peyote. he had violated a general applicable criminal law. His dismissal from the
job resulted directly from his consumption of drugs. Because this criminal law was
constitutional, it was also "consistent with the Free Exercise Clause" to deny the
unemployment compensation."04 The Court held that government may grant such an
exemption from a general applicable criminal law. but the government is not required to
do so. Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, began with a summary of previous
Free Exercise Clause cases. From these cases he developed two major principles how to
decide Free Exercise Clause cases: (1) Government is not allowed to regulate religious
belief 5 and (2) a religiously neutral law would violate the Free Exercise Clause if the
infringement on the free exercise right was intended by the government.
206
The respondents argued that according to the balancing test that was first applied in
Sherbert v. Verner 20 ' the Court had to balance the interests of society and the interests of
the individual in order to resolve the case. The majority found the Sherbert test
inapplicable because it "was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized
government assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."'" Further this test was
only applied in the context of the denial of unemployment benefits because the dismissal
of Oregon to decide whether there was an exemption from the criminal law that would have allowed drug consumption
for sacramental purposes. The Supreme Court of Oregon decided that there was no exemption.
202
Id. at 874.
203
Id. at 874-75.
204
Id. at 890.
205
Id. at 877.
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Id. at 877-78.
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Sherbert v. Vemer. 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
208 Employment Divisions Department. Human Resources v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872. 884 (1990).
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was for "good cause." This good cause standard created a "mechanism for individualized
exemptions." For dismissal from a job because of the violation of a criminal law,
however, the application of the Sherbcrt test would have fatal consequences for
subsequent cases: "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent
upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is
'compelling" - permitting him. by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself.'. .
.
- contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."210 The Court also
distinguished its earlier discussion in Wisconsin v. YoderS in which the Court had given
a religious exemption to Amish students from a compulsory school attendance law.
According the Court in Smith, the plaintiffs in Yonder based their claim not only on the
Free Exercise Clause but also on the "rights of the parents to direct the religious
upbringing of their children." 2 ? These two rights together did outweigh the government
interest in mandating further education after the eighth grade in Yoder. Because Smith II
did not present such a "hybrid situation," but was solely based on a Free Exercise claim,
in
the Court did not consider Yoder to be a binding precedent in this case." " Moreover, the
Court concluded that it should not be in the discretion of the judicial branch to determine
either the compelling interest of the society or the "centrality" of the religious belief in
evaluating Free Exercise claims to religious exemption."
14 Such a determination should
rather be made in the political process:
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned
by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving the accommodation to the
209
Id. at 884.
Id. at 885 (footnote omitted).
211 Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
212
Id. at 233.
Employment Divisions Department. Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 875 (1990).
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence
of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 2 1?
iv. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Of 1993.
According to Smith II, religiously neutral laws are only unconstitutional if the
challenger can prove the intent of the government to impinge on free exercise of religion.
In response to this holding, the U.S. Congress passed in 1993 the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. Briefly said, the Act was intended to restore the principle of strict
scrutiny and the compelling interest test, applied in Sherbert and Yoder, to the full range
of Free Exercise cases.
In City of Boerne v. Flores'
6
the Court, however, held that the RFRA exceeded the
legislative power and infringed on the powers of the judicial branch of the states. As the
Court explained:
Congress' discretion is not unlimited. . . . and the courts retain the power, as
they have since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded
its authority under the Constitution. Broad as the power of Congress is
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. RFRA
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and
the federal balance."
Thus today, a case challenging the constitutionality of a state law in light of the Free
Exercise Clause would be decided under the principles established in Smith II
Id at 889.
City of Bo
17
Id. at 557.
216
erne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507(1997).
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D. Function And Purpose Of The Religion Clauses.
The Framers of the constitution intended the two clauses to work together in order to
ensure complete religious autonomy. Nevertheless, there are cases in which fulfilling the
command of non-establishment and providing free exercise rights at the same time is not
possible. If. for example, government grants exemptions from generally applicable laws
for religious reasons." it accommodates religion in a way that may constitute an
establishment of religion at the same time. Hence, the two clauses sometimes conflict.
When the two clauses operate in this way the doctrines used by the Court to determine
the violation of one clause are also relevant for the determination of a possible violation
of the other clause." Sunday closing laws, for example, were challenged on the grounds
that they violated both religion clauses. ' The government's selection of Sunday as a
uniform day of rest was challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause and a Free
Exercise Clause violation was claimed by business owners who due to their religious
beliefs were forced to close their business on an additional weekday and thereby suffer
economic loss. The Court, however, concluded that the secular purpose behind the
statute, namely the establishment of an uniform day of rest, was sufficient to justify the
laws under both clauses.221
Potential conflicts between the two religious clauses abound. A federal statute
providing chaplains for the armed forces, for example, seems clearly to threaten an
establishment of religion by the federal government, but the refusal to provide such
chaplains would most likely violate the Free Exercise Clause. In such cases arguments
that justify government action under the Free Exercise Clause frequently are the same
18
According to the Courfs holding in Smith II the availability of such exemptions from generally applicable laws lies
solely within the discretion of governments. See supra Part II.C.2.b.iii.
219
Tribe, supra note 4. § 1 4-2. at 1 1 57.
220 McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420 ( 1961 ): Braunfeld v. Brown. 366 U.S. 599 ( 1961 ).
221
Braunfeld v. Brown. 366 U.S. 599, 605-08 (1961).
222
Abington School District v. Schempp. 307 U.S. 203. 309 (1963) (Stewart. J., dissenting) (stating that the refusal to
provide a chaplain might violate the Free Exercise Clause).
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that justify the Establishment Clause violation. Because people should have the
opportunity to exercise their religion even when they are in the armed forces a chaplain
should be provided, but on the other hand, the payment of all these chaplains with federal
funds would violate the taxpayer's right that the government not establish religion.
Hence, the only possible solution in these cases, according to the Court, is to balance the
competing values against each other in order "to find a neutral course between the two
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."
Walz v. Tax Commission. 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 ( 1970).
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN
GERMANY.
A. Overview.
1. The Relationship Between Church And State.
In contrast to the Framers of the United States Constitution, the Parliamentary
Council, which drafted the Basic Law, did not intend a strict separation between church
and state. Instead the Parliamentary Council wanted to give religion a "special role in the
Nation's public life." " Hence, the relationship between church and state in Germany is a
compromise between separation and connection which can be best described as 'limping
separation.
Although church and state are basically independent" from each other, the state
grants some privileges to religious communities, which necessarily leads to a cooperation
between church and state in some areas." All religious communities, for instance, are
eligible for certain state subsidies, and they can organize themselves as corporations
under civil law. In addition, the Basic Law states that some religious holidays are
official national holidays.
22
' The main churches,230 which have the status of corporate
224 Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 503 ( 1 989).
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See Theodor Maunz. Reinhold Zippelius. Deutsches Staatsrecht 237 (30,h ed. 1998) [hereinafter
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See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 140 and Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution of 1919]
[WRV] art. 137 (1) ("There shall be no state church").
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Maunz/Zippelius. supra note 225. at 237-38.
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See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 140 and Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution of 1919]
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See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 140 and Weimarer Reichsverfassung[Constitution of 1919]
[WRV] art. 139.
230 Main churches are the "Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands"XGerman Evangelical Church) and the "Katholische
kirche Deutschlands" (German Catholic Church).
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IT]
bodies under public law. are even allowed to levy taxes upon their members. " Because
of the cooperative relationship between state and church, the churches do not need to
collect the taxes themselves. Instead, the Federal Government collects the church taxes
TIT
together with the income tax and then transfers the former to the churches." " Other areas
in which church and state cooperate very closely with each other are, for instance, the
compulsory religious education in public schools, which has to be paid for by the state,
or the rights of the church to decide about the employment of professors for the theology
department at public universities. 234
In exchange for these privileges, the state has the right of supervision and control
over the religious community within the framework of existing legislation." "^ Religious
communities are, however, allowed to regulate and administer church affairs
independently without government interference. They can enact binding regulations or
guidelines concerning, for example, the time and place of religious exercise, the
qualifications and vocational training of their employees as well as the hierarchy among
religious officials. The state may supervise actions only outside of this area of internal
church affairs. In addition, the Federal Constitutional Court" has given the term
"internal church affairs'" a very broad meaning."
1
As a result the right of control and
Tig
supervision of the state has become smaller over the years." Thus, under current law,
the state may require a new church building to comply with general building and fire
protection regulations and insist that church employees not work more hours than the
31
See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 140 and Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution of 1919]
[WRV]art. 137(6).
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See Maunz/Zippelius, supra note 225. at 237 (explaining different the rights of supervision and control).
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E.g. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 18. 385 (386) and
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 19. 78 (133).
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employment law allows them to work; the state may not. however, question the decision
of a religious community concerning the employment or dismissal of employees.'
Early on. the Federal Constitutional Court held that, outside constitutionally specified
areas of cooperation, the government has to be neutral not only towards religion but also
towards all kinds of ideologies. 240 By analyzing the structure and content of all provisions
of the Basic Law dealing with religion, the Court found that in particular Article 3 (3)
which requires equal treatment for people of different religious beliefs, and Article 4,
which provides for freedom of religion in general, support the conclusion that the state
has to (1) tolerate religion and religious belief (principle of tolerance)," and (2) treat all
people equal regardless of their religious or ideological belief (principle of equal
treatment of religion)." " As a result the government may not, for instance, provide
subsidies or other financial contributions to one religion without giving the same to the
others. Moreover, the principle of neutrality towards religion also prohibits the state
from identifying itself with certain religious beliefs or displaying religious symbols in
state buildings as a sign of identification with a particular religion. Nevertheless, one can
still find governmental reference to religion in German public life, for instance the
display of a cross in each German courtroom or the phrase "So help me God" in the oath
for public offices. These governmental references to the Christian religion, however, do
not violate the principle of neutrality. Because of their longstanding tradition in German
public life they are not considered as governmental identification with religion but merely
39
Id. at 238-39 (providing further examples for internal church affairs and state's right of supervision.).
240
See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 12, 1 (4); BVerfGE
18. 385 (386); BVerfGE 19. 206 (216): BVerfGE 24. 236 (246). In all these cases the Court stressed the need for
neutrality towards every ideology. This principle of neutrality, the so called weltanschauliche Neutralitdt, was derived
from an analysis of the structure and the content of all constitutional provisions that deal with religion.
241
See Ulrich Scheuner. Die Religionsfreiheit im Grundgesetz, DIE OFFENTLICHE Verwaltung [DOV] 67, 585, 592
1966 Musing the Geman term Toleranzgebot).
242
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 19. 206 (216). See also
Theodor Maunz& Gunther DOrig. Kommentar zum grundgesetz Article 140. at 23 (1998) [hereinafter
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as a reference to the important role the Christian religion has played in the historical and
cultural development of Germany.244 When the religious oath or the display of the
religious symbol conflicts with the freedom of religion of an individual the latter prevails:
People who are eligible for public office are not required to include the religious
affirmation in their oath and if somebody objects to the cross in the court room it has to
be removed.245
In conclusion, the state and church are basically separated, but by granting some
privileges to religious communities the state favors religious communities more than
secular organizations. With respect to these privileges there is a necessary connection
between church and state, which makes cooperation between church and state in some
areas inevitable. Aside from these areas of cooperation, however, the government has to
be neutral towards religion in the sense that it tolerates religion and religious beliefs and
does not favor one religion over another.
2. Overview Of The Constitutional Provisions Dealing With Religion.
The German Grundgesetz fBasic Law) 46 has a more complex system of provisions
protecting religious freedoms than the United States Constitution. Aside from Article 4,
the Free Exercise provision of the Basic Law. Article 140 incorporates five articles of the
old Weimar Constitution of 1919. which deal with religion and religious
244
Peter Schade. Grundgesetz mit Kommentierungen. 239 (4 lh ed. 1997).
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See e.g., Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 35, 375
(holding that a cross must be temporarily removed from the courtroom because a Jew objected to litigating under the
cross).
16
The term Grundgesetz or Basic law stems from the fact that it was originally only considered to be a provisonary
Constitution. See Donald P. Kommers. supra note 224. at 35 (1989) ("Under the circumstances of a divided nation,
the founders decided, pending Germany's reunification, to write a basic law instead of a constitution. A constitution in
the German understanding of the term is a framework for the permanent organization of a particular nation-state.")
(footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). Although Germany is now reunited neither the Grundgesetz itself nor its name
has been replaced. As it has proved so useful over all the years, instead of making a new constitution the new "Lander"
have simply been added to the preamble of the Basic Law. See generally Maunz/Zippelius, supra note 225, at 4-16
(providing a good overview of the constitutional history in Germany).
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The Weimar Constitution was the Constitution of the German Reich enacted on August 11, 1919. This Constitution
was replaced by the Grundgesetz in 1949.
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communities, into the Basic Law. In order to understand this strange and unusual
incorporation of old Constitutional Law into the new Constitutional Law it is necessary to
look at the drafting and enacting history of the Basic Law. 248 The Basic Law was drafted
by the Parliamentary Council on the island of Herrenchiemsee. While the intention to
provide freedom of religion as a fundamental right was unanimous, there was much
dispute over how to shape the relationship between Church and State. The main churches
wanted a regulation of this relationship aside from Article 4 of the Basic Law. The
political parties, on the other hand, did not want to regulate this relationship in detail
because of its complexity. This conflict ended with a compromise decision simply to
incorporate some provisions of the old Constitution of 1919 into the Basic Law."
In addition to these provisions, several other Articles of the Basic Law, "prohibiting
discrimination based on religious belief.""
tJ
can be found throughout the Basic Law.
Examples include Articles 3 (3). 33 (3) and 7. Article 3 (3) provides for equal treatment
of all people regardless of their religious beliefs.251 Article 33 guarantees this equal
protection, especially for public office or civil service, by stating that "the enjoyment of
civil rights, eligibility for public office, and rights aquired in the public service shall not
depend on a person's denomination." " Paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 7 deal with
religious instruction in public schools."" Finally, there are several provisions that permit
persons, elected for public offices, to swear the oath of office "without a religious
affirmation.
,,
248
See Rudolf Smend. Staat und Kirche nach dem Bonner Grundgesetz, 1 Zeitschrift fur evangel ischesKirchenrecht
[ZevKR] 1, 1 1-15 (1951 ) (providing further information about the enactment process of the Basic Law).
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See Axel Freiherr von Campenhausen. §136 Religionsfreiheit. in Handbuch des STAATSRECHTS der
Bundesrepublik.Deutschland384 (Josef 1sensee& Paul Kirchhof eds.. 1989) [hereinafter: von Campenhausen],
for a more detailed historical analysis.
250 Kommers. supra note 224, at 445.
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See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 3 (3).
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See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 33 (3).
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See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 7 (2) and 7 (3).
254 See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] |GG] art. 56. 64 (2) and art. 140 in connection with Weimarer
Reichsverfassung [Constitution of 1919] [WRV] art. 136(4).
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B. Article 4 Of The Basic Law
1. Overview
Article 4 can be seen as the core provision guaranteeing the free exercise of
religion. " The religious rights granted are not connected to citizenship and. as a result,
anyone, even a foreign citizen, can claim these rights against all three branches of
government. Moreover, Article 4 is part of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law." As
a result, the amendment process of Article 4 is very difficult2 " 7 and because of Article 19
(2) it is impossible to infringe upon the essential basis of the rights provided by Article 4.
The first 18 articles of the Basic Law contain the fundamental rights, the so-called
Grundrechte.'* These rights represent the "substantive values of the Basic Law" and
they are therefore extremely important in the interpretation of the Basic Law."' In order
to preserve the "substantive values of the Basic Law" represented by these articles.
Article 19 (2) declares that "in no case may the essence of a basic right be encroached
upon/' 260 It is therefore impossible for the German government to eliminate the rights
and values that are protected by the first 18 Articles. With regard to Article 4, Article 19
(2) clearly prohibits the elimination of freedom of religion, the free exercise right and the
rights of the conscientious objectors of Article 4 (3).
261
In addition. Article 19 (2) hinders
the elimination of the principle of government neutrality towards religion, because it is
255
See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 4.
256
The fundamental rights are found in article 1 to 18 of the Basic Law.
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See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution) [GG] art. 79 (regulating the amendment process. According to paragraph
two an amendment must be carried by two thirds of the members of the Bundestag and two third of the votes of the
Bundesrat.).
258 See K.OMMERS. supra note 224. at 37 (referring to these fundamental rights as the Bill of Rights.).
259
See Kommers. supra note 224, at 37. See also Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal
Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 6. 40 (1957) (holding that the Basic Law constitutes an objective order of values.).
See Kommers. supra note 224. at 324. for an analysis of this case in English.
260
See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 19 (2) ("In no case may the essence of a basic right be
encroached upon.").
261 Bodo Pieroth & Bernhard Schlink, Grundrechte 76-77 (9th ed. 1993) [hereinafter Pieroth/Schunk].
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derived from an interpretation of different basic rights and thus also reflects a
"substantive value of the Basic Law."262
Article 4 itself is divided into three paragraphs, each of them protecting a different
aspect of religion. While the first paragraph deals with the freedom of faith and
conscience, the second paragraph provides the right of undisturbed practice of religion.
The third paragraph, deals with conscientious objection to military service, declaring that
"no one may be compelled against his conscience to perform service in war involving the
use of arms." This constitutional protection of the possibility for conscientious
objectors to refuse military service is unique in the world. 264
2. Restrictions On The Freedoms Of Article 4.
Unlike many other constitutional provisions, Article 4 contains neither a reservation
clause" nor any other restriction. That does not mean, however, that the protections of
Article 4 are unlimited. Early in the history of the Federal Republic, the Federal
Constitutional Court held that conflicting fundamental rights of others may limit the
freedoms provided by Article 4. 266 This reasoning is based on the theory that the Basic
Law constitutes an "objective order of values,"267 which was developed by the Court in
the Elfes Case" in 1 95 1 . According to Elfes the Basic Law is not an accumulation of
constitutional provisions, but rather an expression of the "basic value choices of the
262
Johannes Rux. Bekenntnisfreiheit in der Schule, DER Staat 523. 550 n. 1 2 1 (1 996).
263 See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] |GG] art. 4 (3).
264
See KOMMERS. supra note 224. at 462. Because this provision is not relevant for this paper, I will refrain from
further examination. For more information about article 4(3). see Kommers. supra note 224. at 462.
65 A reservation clause is a clause in the article itself that allows government to regulate or to restrict the constitutional
freedom provided by this article. See e.g., article 12(1 )("The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated
by or pursuant to a law " I
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Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 28, 243 (260-61 ) (the
German original reads as follows: "'Nur kollidierende Grundrechte Drifter und andere mit Verfassungsrang
ausgestattete Rechtswerte sind mit Rucksicht auf die Einheit der Verfassung und die von ihr geschiitzte Wertordnung
ausnahmsweise imstande. auch uneischrankbare Grundrechte in einzelnen Beziehungen zu begrenzen.").
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This is the term Professor Kommers uses for the German expression objektive Werteordnung des Grundgeseizes.
See Kommers, supra note 224. at 55.
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Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 6, 40 (1957); see
Kommers. supra note 224. at 324. for an analysis of this case in English.
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framers." Consequently, an interpretation of one provision of the Basic Law must
always take into account the structure and intent of the Basic Law as a complete
document. "[E]ach constitutional clause is in a definite relationship with all other clauses,
and . . . together they form an entity."2 ° By applying this theory to Article 4, the court
has concluded that the framers did not consider Article 4 to be more important than the
other fundamental rights, such as the right of free speech271 or the freedom of action. 7 In
cases where other constitutional rights conflict with the exercise of the freedoms of
Article 4, the Court must use a balancing test to weigh which right takes precedence in
order to find an acceptable solution. In order to decide whether a church could be
required to refrain from ringing their bells on Sunday morning the court has to balance
the free exercise right of the religious community against the right of personal freedom of
other people who live next to the church and feel disturbed by the noise. 27 ? The Court is
limited in its discretion to balance conflicting constitutional rights in that neither of the
rights in question may encroach on the "core essence" or "basic value" of other
constitutional rights. In the above mentioned example the court found an acceptable
solution by allowing the churches to ring their bells for religious reasons at any time,
whereas ringing of the bells for secular reasons, as for example to tell the time, could be
regulated by law. In making such a distinction the court ensured that the free exercise
right was guaranteed and that, on the other hand, the rights of private freedom of the
2bQ Kommers, supra note 224, at 56.
270
Kommers, supra note 224. at 53 citing Justice Leibholz (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
271
See Appendix, Clrundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 5.
272
See Appendix, Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 2 ( 1 ).
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See Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Highest Administrative Court] [BVerwGE] 86,62 (holding that
the church may ring their bells for religious reasons at any time. On the other hand, ringing the bells for secular
reasons, like for example after the passing of each hour can be prohibited during nighttime.).
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Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court) [BVerfG] 28, 243 (261 ) (the
German original reads as follows: "Dabei auftretende Konflikte lassen sich nur losen. indem ermittelt wird, welche
Verfassungsbestimmung fur sich fur die konkret zu entscheidende Frage das hohere Gewicht hat. Die schwachere
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church neighbors were also not unduly burdened. 275 The court would have encroached
upon the "core essence" of this right of private freedom if it would have granted the
churches the right to ring their bells unregulated at any time, because such a holding
would have completely ignored the right of personal freedom.
In summary, although the wording of Article 4 provides no explicit restrictions, the
freedom of religion may be limited by other conflicting basic rights. In order to decide
such fundamental right conflicts, the Court must weigh and balance the affected rights
against each other.
3. Article 4(1).
a. The Meaning Of The Enumeration OfDifferent Rights.
The first paragraph of Article 4 enumerates different kinds of freedom: the freedom of
faith, the freedom of conscience, the freedom of religious creed and the freedom of
ideological creed. The reason for this unusual and seemingly strange enumeration can be
found in the historical development of the freedom of religion. While today, these
freedoms are all protected by the freedom of religion, there was actually a difference in
the protection until the enactment of the Weimar Constitution in 1919.
th th
In the 16 and 17 Century only the Catholic and the Lutheran creeds were
considered under the law to be religious beliefs. But even for these two churches religious
freedom in fact did not exist. At that time, the religious beliefs of subjects was
determined for them by their sovereign under the principle cuius regio - eius religio, a
Latin expression meaning that the person who reigns determines the religion of his
servants.
27
' Moreover, the sovereign had not only the power to establish the official
religion but also the power to prohibit all other religions and sects and to expel their
75
See Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Highest Administrative Court] [BVerwGE] 86.62.
276 Martin Heckel. Deutschland im konfessionellen Zeitalter 33 (1983).
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followers (ius reprobandi)." 6 As a result, religious persecution was very common at that
time.
At the end of the 18 th century this viewpoint began to change. Following adoption of
the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789, many of the
German States recognized freedom of religion in their constitutions.27 Freedom of
religion, however, was still only granted to the two main churches and not to other
religions and ideologies. This different treatment of the religions was finally overcome
with the enactment of the Weimar Constitution in 1919. For the first time in Germany
freedom of religion was guaranteed to all religions: Article 135 guaranteed the freedom of
faith, conscience and creed to every citizen of the German Reich.278
Unfortunately unlimited freedom of religion was only temporary. With Hitler's
seizure of power in 1933, the freedom of religion was again limited to its "very narrowest
essence.'" Under the pretense of fostering a national Christian religion the Nazis
interpreted the term religion in the very narrow sense that it only embraced those religious
beliefs that were closely related to National Socialism. Although the Weimar Constitution
was still technically valid under the new National Socialist regime, Article 135 was soon
displaced and superseded by new regulations and laws. 283 Under the pretense that the
government and public life should be freed from religious interference, the Nazis
narrowed the freedom of faith and conscience to protect only Protestants and Catholics
and placed severe restraints on the belief and the free exercise of all other religions.
276 Of course, the sovereign could also tolerate other religion (ius tolerandi) or allow people with different beliefs to
emigrate (ius emigrandi). However, not many sovereign, especially not those who were Catholics, have used these two
possibilities. See Martin Heckel, Ius reformandi, Evangeslische Staatsrechtlehre [EvStL], 1 1. 1415.
277
von Campenhausen. supra note 249, at 384.
278
Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution of 1919] [WRV] art. 135 (1).
279
von Campenhausen, supra note 249. at 389 (the German original reads as follows: "Spatestens seit 1936 war die
Kirchenpolitik ganz auf die Einschrankung des Grundrechts auf einen innersten Kern ausgerichtet.") (citations
omitted).
280 The freedom of religion under Article 135 was one of the constitutional rights that could not be suspended in case
of emergency by the President of the Reich. Thus, it is frequently questioned today whether Article 135 was still valid
under the National Socialism. See generally JOrg Winter, Die Wissenschaft vom Staatskirchenrecht im dritten
Reich, pp. 29 (1979) and von Campenhausen. supra note 249, at 388-89, for this dispute.
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The seemingly strange collection of different rights in Article 4 (1), therefore, is the
result of a strong reaction against the restraints on the freedom of religion under the Nazi
7X
1
regime." The post-war framers of the Basic Law sought to eliminate the possibility that
the government could formally recognize freedom of religion, but then limit some forms
of religious beliefs or expression, by giving the term "freedom of religion" a very narrow
meaning. They relied upon cumbersome constitutional language in order to ensure the
permanence of the fundamental rights.
Thus, the enumeration of different freedoms of belief in Article 4 (1) -- originally
intended to clarify the protections that had become distorted in the time of National
Socialism — today, has no importance in constitutional interpretation: The Federal
Constitutional Court currently considers the different freedoms to be synonyms for each
787
other; instead of using the term freedom of faith, the Court, for example, uses the term
freedom of creed. 28 '
b. The Freedom Of Faith And Creed.
The freedom of faith and creed, the basis of the religious freedoms," is expressly
protected by the first paragraph of Article 4. This provision protects not only the freedom
to have a certain distinct belief, but also the freedom to have no belief at all. According to
the Federal Constitutional Court, it does not even matter if the non-believer is indifferent
to all religious creeds, or does not want to think about it or if he/she simply has not made
up her mind with respect to religious matters. Moreover, Article 4 not only protects
religious belief or non-belief, but also the freedom of ideological creed. Thus, Marxism,
281
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfCiE] 24, 236 (245).
82
von Campenhausen. supra note 249. at 392.
83
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 12. 1 (4). See also von
Campenhausen. supra note 249. at 392 n. 105 (providing further examples).
284
von Campenhausen. supra note 249, at 395 (stating that the freedom of faith and creed is the centerpiece of the
freedom of religion).
285 Maunz/Durig. supra note 242. Article 4 at 23.
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TO/
for example, is protected by Article 4. even though it has no religious content at all."
This rule blocks the persecution of people on the basis of their ideological creed as well
as their religion.
The interpretation of freedom of faith and creed in Article 4 (1) is very extensive,
protecting almost every kind of belief287 or non-belief. As a result, when referring to the
freedom of faith and creed that is protected by Article 4(1), the Federal Constitutional
Court often uses the term forum internum, which includes the whole internal system of
thought concerning faith and creed.283 The protection of this forum internum is absolute,
and government cannot infringe upon it in any way.
4. Article 4 (2).
a. The Right OfFree Exercise.
The second paragraph of Article 4 provides: "The undisturbed practice of religion
shall be guaranteed."2 ° If taken literally, one might conclude that only the free exercise
of religion would be protected and not the exercise of non-religious belief. Such a
conclusion, however, would be a mistake. The theory behind the Basic Law as an
"objective order of values" requires not only the interpretation of one basic right in the
light of the whole Constitution but also the evaluation of one single paragraph with
respect to the rest of the Article. Thus, the second paragraph must be read in connection
with the first. There would be no real freedom of faith or creed if the Constitution did not
286
von Campenhausen. supra note 249. at 396.
87
Problems in this area arise mainh with the new sects. Freedom of faith does not protect any opinion, but only those
which are based on religious, ethical or methaphysical grounds. In determining whether a certain belief fulfills these
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Campenhausen. supra note 249. at 396.
288 Maunz/Durig, supra note 242. Article 4 at 27. von Campenhausen, supra note 245, at 395, Pieroth/Schlink.
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von Campenhausen. supra note 249. at 395 (stating that this freedom is unlimited) See also Entscheidungen des
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Appendix, Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 4 (2).
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also protect the possibility of refusing to lead a life according to faith or creed.
292
In fact,
the Federal Constitutional Court has never made a distinction between religious and non-
religious practice.
293 As a result, living in a kolkhoz, or a collective farm, would be
protected under Article 4 as free exercise and practice of an ideological belief. Indeed, the
Court has even found the right of free exercise to be guaranteed not only by Article 4 (2),
but also by Article 4 (l). 294 Although Article 4(1) speaks only about freedom of faith,
conscience and creed, it must logically also incorporate the right to carry this faith to the
outside by religious exercise, proselytizing, or propaganda. 295 As a consequence of this
holding, the narrow wording of Article 4 (2), with its reference only to the "practice of
religion,'
,,
has now become irrelevant. The first paragraph in effect supersedes the second,
so that the latter now only has a confirming and clarifying meaning.
b. Restraints On The Free Exercise Right.
As concluded in the preceding section, free exercise is considered to be the right of
everybody to live in compliance with his faith and to act according to his inner
conviction." This right is guaranteed against all three branches of government. The
branches are not allowed to infringe the free exercise right without having a good reason.
A court may not. for example, schedule a trial hearing for a Jew on a religious holiday,"
292
von Campenhausen, supra note 249. at 401
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293
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Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 32. 98 ( 106) (the
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inneren Glaubensiiberzeugung gemafi zu handeln").
297
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(1330).
54
and the legislature may not prescribe the denial of unemployment benefits to workers
who refuse to work on their religious holidays.298
In some limited circumstances, however, it may be necessary to limit the free exercise
right if it conflicts with the fundamental rights of others.29^ The fundamental rights
system ensures that within the community everybody has the right to live and the right to
self-fulfillment in so far as they do not violate the rights or interests of other citizens. 30
Along those lines, the Federal Constitutional Court has concluded that behaviors that
question essential principles of the legal community or the proper existence of the legal
community itself cannot be protected by the Constitution. 301
According to this principle, those religious practices that conflict with criminal law or
regulations considered to benefit the whole society are very often restricted or not
allowed. In the 1970s, for example, some people had refused to pay the total amount of
their electricity bills as a means of protesting against the generation of atomic energy.
Even though their refusal was based on ideological belief, the Federal Constitutional
Court denied the protection of this practice by Article 4. 302 Five years later, the Court
reached the same conclusion in rejecting claims by persons who refused to pay taxes and
to make other contributions because of religious or ideological reasons. 303 To allow such
a practice, concluded the Court, would endanger the whole social system, which is based
on the contributions of all citizens.
Entscheidung des Bundessozialgerichtshofes [Supreme Social Insurance Court] |BSGE] 51, 70 (73).
29<l
See supra Part III.B.2. tor the necessity of a restriction of the freedom of religion.
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In some cases a person's free exercise right might conflict with the free exercise
rights of other people. This conflict can arise in two ways. There can be a conflict that
involves people of different beliefs or a conflict that arises between non-believers and
believers. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, in both types of conflicts the
courts have to find a neutral solution by balancing the competing rights against each
other. This result seems obvious in cases that deal with a conflict involving people of
different beliefs. If, for instance, a public school teacher is teaching in his religious garb,
the court has to balance his free exercise right against the competing religious freedom of
the children to receive a religiously neutral secular education.
6 On the other hand,
requiring such a balancing process for conflicts involving believers and non-believers
might not. at first sight, seem to be a satisfying solution. One might conclude that the free
exercise right of the non-believer gives him the right to be free from exposure to religious
practice. This, however, is not the case. The free exercise right of the non-believers goes
as far as that of the believers. If the believers have the right to practice their religion, the
non-believers have the right not to practice religion. But neither believers nor non-
believers may insists that others refrain from their religious practice. In the School
Prayer case,
308
for instance, the Federal Constitutional Court held that a student who did
not want to participate in a prayer contrary to his religious belief could not prevent his
fellow students from praying. 30
05
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 41. 29 (pp. 49);
BeVerfTJE 4 1 . 65 (78ff); BVerfGE 44. 1 96 ( 1 990; BVerfGE 52. 223 (223 ); BVerfGE 93. 1 5 ( 1 5ff)
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See infra Part IV. d. 2. (analyzing this kind of conflict and its solution in more detail.).
307 Maunz/Durig. supra note 242. Article 4 at 24: von Campenhausen. supra note 249. 427-28; Pieroth/Schlink,
supra note 261, at 135.141.
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Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 52. 223. See Kommers,
supra note 224, at 499-72, for a translation of this case.
309 Mat 251.
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5. Conclusion.
Freedom of religion, according to Article 4. means first of all the freedom to choose,
to have, or to refrain from choosing or having, a certain religious or non-religious faith.
The definition of faith is extensive and covers the whole of one's inner convictions, the
so-called forum internum. If a person's inner conviction has no direct effect on others,
this freedom of faith is protected absolutely under Article 4 of the Basic Law.
Additionally, the freedom of religion provides the right of free exercise. Contrary to
the narrow wording of the second paragraph of Article 4. this free exercise right is
guaranteed for every kind of belief, religious or ideological. The free exercise right,
however, is not unlimited. It can be subject to regulation if a religious practice would
violate the fundamental rights of other people or if it endangers the fundamental order of
the German Constitution.
C. Article 140 Of The Basic Law In Connection With Articles 136-139, 141 Of The
Weimar Constitution.
Article 140 of the Basic Law states that "[T]he provisions of Articles 136. 137, 138,
139 and 141 of the German Constitution of 1 1 August 1919 shall be an integral part of
this Basic Law."310
Through this incorporation process, five provisions of the Weimar Constitution have
become a part of the Basic Law. with the same rank as all other constitutional provisions
of the Basic Law itself. 311 As a consequence these provisions must also be interpreted in
the light of the "substantive values of the Basic Law."
312
Because all five provisions deal
with the relationship between Church and State, the courts frequently have to interpret the
meaning of these provisions in connection with Article 4. According to the Federal
10
Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 140.
" Maunz/Durig, supra note 242. Article 140 at 6.
312 See supra Part 1I1.B. 1 and 2.
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Constitutional Court, conflicts arising between these five constitutional provisions and
Article 4 should be solved by balancing the values each provision will affect. ' Because
Articles 136-139 and 141 of the Weimar Constitution are not very relevant for the issue
of religion in public schools the following paragraph will only provide a brief summary
of these provisions.
Articles 136-139 and 141 of the Weimar Constitution regulate mainly the relationship
between Church and State. They can be compared to the establishment clause of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, although the relationship between church
and state differs in the two countries. 314 Article 136 deals mainly with the protection of
the individual's freedom of religion. As these protections are already guaranteed by other
Basic Law provision, such as Articles 4 and 33 (3). Article 136 of the Weimar
Constitution is frequently seen as only having a clarifying meaning. 31 ^ Article 137 can be
seen as the most important of these five articles because it sets forth the basic principles
that govern the church-state-relationship in Germany. 316 The first paragraph of Article
137 prohibits the establishment of a state church, whereas the other seven paragraphs
regulate the relationship between the church and the state in more detail and grant some
privileges to religious communities."'
i7
Articles 138 and 139 grant further privileges to
religious communities, like the right to own property and the recognition of Christian
holidays as national holidays. Finally. Article 141 permits religious organizations to
provide religious service and pastoral work in the military service, hospitals, prisons or
other public institutions.
3,1
Joseph Listl. Das Grundrecht der Religionsfreiheit in der Rechtsprechung der Gerichte der Bundes
republik Deutschland 54. 354-356 ( 1 97 1 ).
See supra Part I1I.A.1.
315
Maunz/DORIG, supra note 242, Article 140 at 33.
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See Appendix. Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution of 1919] [GG] an. 137.
317
See supra Part III. A. 1. (explaining the church-state relationship and the privileges of the religious communities in
more detail.).
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See Appendix. Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution of 1919] [GG] art. 138 (2) and 139.
IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
An exploration and discussion of all aspects of the relationship between religion and
public schools would exceed the limits of this paper. As a result, the following discussion
is limited to three specific areas of particularly significant conflict: (1) the
constitutionality of prayer in public schools, (2) the question whether religious symbols
are allowed in public schools and (3) the proper scope of free exercise rights of teachers
in public schools. Before a comparison of cases in these three areas can take place, it is
necessary to offer an overview of how the public school system is organized in both
countries and to contrast the roles that religion plays in the public school systems of the
United States and Germany.
A. The Relationship Between Public Schools And Religion In General.
1. Public Schools And Religion In The United States.
a. The Public School System In The United States.
Unlike the German Basic Law, 9 the United States Constitution does not address the
issue of school education. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that education is not
considered to be a fundamental right that can be claimed against the federal
government. ° Asa result, education is a matter left primarily to the discretion of the
states. All state constitutions include clauses that concern education/ ' Some state
constitutions are very general on this matter, while others are more specific. All of them.
319
See infra Part IV. A.2.
320
See San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez. 4 1 1 U.S. 1 (1973) and Plyer v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
321 Michael W. La Morte, School Law 1 1 (6th ed. 1998).
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however, have incorporated at least two fundamental aspects in their public school
system: First, public schools education is made available free of charge. Second, there are
virtually no limitations on access to public schools.
322
Aside from certain areas in which
federal legislation supersedes the states* legislative power,323 it is the state legislature that
establishes rules for employment, curriculum and exam regulation.324 Because it would
be almost impossible for the state to regulate the school system to the very last detail, the
states have delegated this power to the local school boards. In order to implement the
general regulations which the states have set, local school boards adopt policies, rules and
regulations which have the force of law.325
b. The Role OfReligion In Public Schools.
In the United States the relationship between church and state is primarily governed
by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which requires government
neutrality towards religion. The basic principle of separation between church and state
also governs the relationship between religion and the public school. Any introduction of
religion into a public school is considered to be unconstitutional when it constitutes an
establishment of religion by the school authorities. Hence, a state statute prescribing
in/
religious instruction in public schools would be unconstitutional." Similarly, a state may
not ban the teaching of evolution from the biology curriculum " or try to "compensate"
322
Id at 81-84. See also Paulson v. Minidoka County School District No 331, 96 Idaho 469. 472 (Idahol970);
Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984); Cardiff v. Bismarck Public School District. 263 N.W.2d 105 (N.D.
1978) (providing an overview of state's constitutional provisions and cases that deal with the issue of school fees).
" The employment law. for example, contains a lot of federal regulations that supersede or replace contradictory state
legislation. In addition to the federal legislation, the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution also influence state legislation because of their general applicability.
324 La Morte. supra note 321, at 12.
325
Id. at 13.
326
See e.g.. Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that religious instruction
in public schools under a released time agreement by private teachers is unconstitutional under the First Amendment);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (upholding a released time program in which the students received religious
instruction outside the school property).
327
See Epperson v. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating a statute that prohibited the teaching of evolution and
the use of textbooks that suggested that ""mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animal" )
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the teaching of evolution by requiring the teaching of creationism even' time evolution is
taught, because such choices inject religious doctrines into the curriculum/"'
In conclusion, religion must be separated from the public school system to the same
degree as it is from the state in general. The wall of separation between church and state
prohibits not only religious instruction in public schools, but it also means that in
principle no religious belief may be advanced or disfavored by the school. There are.
however, exceptions to this rule of strict separation. One such exception concerns the
combination of religious holidays with school holidays. Christmas and Thanksgiving are
generally seen not only as religious holidays but also as national holidays based on
historical American traditions. j29 Thus, the state can declare school holidays on these
occasions. Good Friday, on the other hand, has no such secular connotation according to
at least one court. A state statute declaring it to be official school holiday would therefore
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause/130
2. Public Schools And Religion In Germany.
a. Overview.
Secondary education in Germany comes in diverse forms and has been fairly
characterized as multidimensional and complex/ 31 States, municipalities, religious
organizations, and even private persons can create or open new schools as long as the
founding entity takes on legal responsibility for the school. Hence, there are many
different types of schools from which students can choose. Ersatzschulen, Rudolf-
328
See Edwards v. Aguillard. 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating a Louisiana statute which required that the teaching of
evolution must be accompanied by the teaching of creation science because it clearly advanced a religious doctrine).
329
See e.g. Lynch \. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668. 674 (1984) (describing the process by which Thanksgiving became a
National Holiday "more than one century ago.").
330
See Metzl v. Leininger. 850 F. Supp. 740 (111. 1994) (stating that a statute that required Good Friday to be one of
the twelve official school holidays would be unconstitutional).
331 Maunz/Durig. supra note 242. Article 7. at 13.
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Steiner-Schulen. Waldorffschulen and vocational schools provide just a few examples.
The reason for this diversity of school types lies not only in the historical development of
the school system in Germany/"53 but also in the fact that most of the legislative power to
regulate the school system is delegated to the Lander, the German equivalent to the
'l'lA
American states. ~ Aside from certain limited areas which have to be regulated by the
federal government, ? the Lander are. in principle, free to regulate the school system
within their territories. Lander have the right to establish and even to eliminate certain
schools. Lander may choose where and what type of school has to be established,
336
and
define the curriculum and exam regulations. This extensive regulatory power is only
limited by Article 7 of the Basic Law. which provides certain guidelines which the
Lander must take into account.
b. Article 7 Of The Basic Law.
In six paragraphs. " Article 7 of the Basic Law sets forth the constitutional principles
for the school system in Germany. Beyond the requirements imposed by Article 7, the
Lander are free to provide a more detailed framework for the school system in their
territory. As in the United States, the Lander delegate regulatory power for final details to
administrative bodies. These administrative bodies are free to perform their tasks
32
Ersatzsehulen are private schools which may replace the public schools. Rodolf-Steiner-Schulen are schools that
were founded by the Theosophist Rudolph Steiner and Waldorffschulen base their curriculum mainly on arts and
science. Unlike many other schools the Waldorffschule does not grade their pupils.
33
See Maunz/Durig. supra note 242. Article 7. at 13 (stating that the diversity in the schools system is based on
historical, ideological, pedagogical and sociological reasons).
334
See Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 70 ( 1 ). According to this article "[t]he Lander have the right to legislate in
so far as this Basic Law does not confer legislative powers on the Federation." Concerning the area of education and
schools the legislative powers are not conferred on the Federation. The legislative power remains, therefore, with the
Lander.
35
E.g.. the regulation of educational grants, of the length of compulsory school education and the regulation of the
enrollment age. See Maunz/Durig. supra note 242, Article 7. at 1 1. 23-24.
36
Public schools can be established as denominational, interdenominational or as non-denominational schools.
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See infra Part I V. A.2.b.
38 As only the first three paragraphs are dealing with public schools, the overview will be restricted to those
paragraphs. See Maunz/Durig. supra note 242, Article 7. 47-53, for a further analysis of Article 7.
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according to their own administrative guidelines with the exception of certain limitations
discussed below.
The first paragraph of Article 7 restricts the general autonomy of the school
administration by stating that *"[t]he entire school system shall be under the supervision of
the state/' Since private schools are also a part of the comprehensive school system of
Germany, they are subject to state supervision. This state supervision, however, is more
limited than the supervision of the public schools, because Article 7 (3) grants the private
schools certain regulatory freedoms.
340 The Federal Constitutional Court has given
Article 7 (1) a very broad meaning by holding that Article 7 (1) gives the states also the
right to regulate certain educational issues on a statewide or even nationwide basis.
41
According to the Court. Article 7(1) gives the states the regulatory power to organize and
structure the school system in a centralized way in order to assure that all students can
receive the kind of education that best reflects their abilities. Basic regulations are thus
established at a state level and include, for example, the determination of the curriculum
and the identification of compulsory subjects. States also determine whether a school
may be established, significantly changed or eliminated.
Article 7 (3) provides that "'[rjeligious instruction shall form part of the curriculum in
state schools except non-denominational [state] schools."343 Non-denominational state
schools are public schools that are neutral towards all religious denominations in the
sense that they neither provide religious instruction nor show any affiliation to a religions
,q
See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 7 ( 1 ).
340
See Maunz/Durig. supra note 242, Article 7. 17-22 (providing details for the graded supervision according to the
type of school).
41
See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 26. 222.
42
See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGF] 26. 222. 228 (the
German original reads as follows: "Zur staatlichen Aufsicht iiber iiber die Schulen gehort die Befugnis des Staates zur
zentralen Ordnung und Organisation des Schulwesens mit dem Ziel. ein Schulsystem zu gewahrleisten. das alien
jungen Biirgern gematt ihren Fahigkeiten die dem heutigen gesellschaftlichen Leben entsprechenden
Bildungsmbglichkeiten eroffnet. Dem Staat steht die Schulplanung und die Moglichkeit der Einwirkung auf Errichtung
und Aufhebung der einzelnen bffentlichen Schulen zu."*).
343
See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 7 (3).
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sect. Non-denominational public schools, however, are extremely rare in Germany, and
only a few Lander have established their entire public school system on a non-
denominational basis. 345 Another type of public school is the public denominational
school. Unlike the United States, the German Lander may establish denominational
public schools in which the education in all subjects is closely linked to a certain
religious belief.
346
Although the constitutionality of the state established religiously
affiliated schools is unquestioned in Germany,347 denominational public schools are very
rare today. In Bavaria, for instance, it was mandated by law that each public elementary
school had to be established as a denominational school. In 1967. however, the passage
of a referendum forced the Bavarian government to change most of the denominational
schools into Christian interdenominational schools, the third type of public school that
exists in Germany. 4 The Christian interdenominational school,349 also called
Gemeinschaftsschule, is the most common public school type in Germany. ~ As with
non-denominational public schools. Christian interdenominational schools are open for
children of all religious beliefs. Nevertheless, they differ from the non-denominational
schools in the sense that they are (1) affiliated with the Christian faith, and (2)
constitutionally required to provide religious instruction.
344 Some non-denominational schools provide a general and neutral instruction in the different religious and
ideological beliefs. This instruction, however, is not considered to be religious instruction according to Article 7 (3) of
the Basic Law. See Maunz/DOrig. supra note 242. Article 141, at 11.
345
E.g., Berlin and Bremen. These two Lander do not provide religious instruction in public schools at all. Some
schools provide a general non-denominational instruction in the different religious and ideological beliefs. This
instruction, however, is not considered to be religious instruction according to Article 7 (3) of the Basic Law.
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Fritz Ossenbuhl. Organisation des offentlichen Schulwesens. Neuste Juristische Wochenzeitschrift [NJW] 1375
(1976).
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Johannes Rux, Bekenntmsfreiheit in der Schule. Der Staat 523, 528 ( 1 996) (stating that the constitutionality of
this school type is derived from a historical interpretation of Article 7 (5) of the Basic Law. This provision allows the
establishment of denominational, non-denominational, or alternative private schools only when no state school of that
type exists locally From the wording of this Article it can be therefore concluded that the framers of the Basic Law
wanted to allow a public denominational school.); See also Peter Badura. Das Kreuz im Klassenzimmer. BAYRISCHES
Verwaltungsblatt [BayVBl.] 71. 73 (1996).
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Johannes Rux. Bekenntmsfreiheit in der Schule, Der Staat 523. 525 n. 1 1 (1996).
349
Professor Kommers translate the German Gemeinschaftschule into Christian interdenominational schools. See
Kommers. supra note 224, at 473.
,0
They are the standard public school type in Bavaria Baden-Wurtemberg. and North-Rhine/Westphalia. See
Christoph Link. Staat Crux 9 NEUSTE JURISTISCHE WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW] 3353. 3354(1995).
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The religious affiliation with the Christian faith is obvious in the secular school
subjects because the teacher of such subjects in a Gemeinschaftsschule may refer to the
Christian faith as a main factor for the cultural and educational development in
Germany. ^ The development of the Lutheran-Protestant religion and its effects on
Germany's social development, for example, is part of the regular curriculum in these
interdenominational schools. Hence, the religious affiliation of the Gemeinschaftsschulen
allows them to place an emphasis on the Christian tradition and on the Christian faith,
where as the non-denominational schools have to be neutral towards religion. Religious
affiliation does not mean, however, that Gemeinschaftsschulen are allowed to proselytize
the pupils by setting the Christian faith as being absolute. By doing so, the state, which
maintains the public school system, would violate the principle of neutrality towards
religious beliefs set forth in Articles 4 and 140 of the Basic Law. Even an
interdenominational school like the Gemeinschaftsschule is not allowed to influence the
students towards a certain religious belief outside the area of religious instruction: "Thus,
the school may not be a missionary school and may not demand commitment to Christian
articles of faith. Also it must remain open to other ideological and religious ideas and
values."
333
According to Article 7 (3) interdenominational public schools are required to provide
religious instruction. Although the Gemeinschaftschulen are based on the Christian faith,
religious instruction in these schools is not only given in the Christian faith, but also in
all other religious beliefs for which there are enough students to form a class for religious
instruction.^
4
Religious instruction is to be taught according to the guiding principles of
51
Id. at 3354 (the German original reads as follows: "In der Sache heiBt das. daB in den profanen Fachern der
christliche Charakter in erster Linie durch die Anerkennung des Christentums als pragender Kultur- und
Bildungsfaktor bestimmt wird. wie er sich in der abendlandischen Kultur herausgebildet hat.") (emphasis omitted). See
also Kommers. supra note 220. at 477 (citing a Federal Constitutional Court decision).
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See supra Part HI A.I and C. 2., for an explanation of the principle of neutrality.
353 Kommers. supra note 224. at 477 (citing a decision of the German Constitutional Court)
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As a result many German public schools offer also religious education for Muslin or Jewish children. See Rolf
Schieder. Zwangzum Unterricht in siaatltcher Weltanschauung. SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG , April 16. 1996. at 3.
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the particular religious belief and by a certified teacher. 3 All expenses and costs have to
be carried by the state."6 Moreover, the right of religious instruction is not only a simple
constitutional statement, but rather a guarantee for parents, children and religious
communities to receive religious instruction in every public school except for non-
denominational public schools.
The right to receive religious instruction does not mandate children to attend religious
instruction contrary to their religious belief. Paragraph two of Article 7 grants parents the
right "to decide whether children receive religious instruction."" ' This provision can be
seen as lex specialis to the general right of Article 6 (2) of the parents for the "care and
upbringing of children
1 '' 3
because, according to the Gesetz iiber religiose
Kindererziehung, the law governing religious education for children, the parents have the
right to decide about the participation of their child in the religious instruction until the
child becomes 14 years old. 36J From age 14 on. the child can determine by herself
whether she wants to receive religious instruction. Reasons for refusing to participate do
not have to be given. Until the summer of 1998. the main problem that arose in the
context of Article 7 (2) was the question whether participation in ethics classes could be
required as compulsory for students who do not participate in religious instruction, or if
Article 7 (2) also allowed the parents, or the child, to object to participation in such
classes. In the summer of 1998, the highest administrative court in Germany resolved this
question by holding that students who object to participation in religious instruction
could be required to participate in ethics classes instead.
361
Arguing that Article 7 (1)
grants the state the power to regulate important school issues, the court concluded that the
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Maifnz/Durig. supra note 242. Article 7 at 32-34.
356 Maunz/Durig, supra note 242. Article 7 at 33.
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See Gesetz iiber religiose Kindererziehung [Law governing the religious education of children] [RelKErzG] § 5,
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Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [Highest Adminstrative Court] [BVerwGE) 6C1 1.97 (June 1998).
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state may not only regulate the content of the curriculum and determine the compulsory
subjects along traditional lines, but that the state may also establish completely new
compulsory subjects, like an ethics class for students who do not participate in religious
instruction. As long as ethics is instructed in a religiously and ideologically neutral
fashion, ethics can be a compulsory subject in lieu of religious instruction/ 6 " The ethics
curriculum in almost every German Land is defined as a general overview of the different
religious and non-religious beliefs and ideologies and the teacher chosen to give ethics
generally tends to be only minimally committed towards a certain religious belief or
ideology. Thus, the danger that ethics is taught in a non-neutral fashion, favoring either a
religious or an ideological belief, is as minimal as it is for other secular subjects, like
history or economy.
c. Conclusion.
Article 7 of the Basic Law provides the foundation for the school system in Germany.
According to the first paragraph, the whole school system is subject to state supervision.
This right of supervision has been interpreted very broadly by the Federal Constitutional
Court in the sense that it is not only a right of supervision but also a right to regulate
certain important educational issues on a state or even nationwide basis. The third
paragraph of Article 7 guarantees the right of religious instruction in public schools.
Religious instruction is therefore provided in almost every public school. It is part of the
•> /: >
standard curriculum, and it is graded. ~ Paragraph 2 of Article 7 gives parents the right to
decide whether the child shall receive religious instruction and, according to the law that
governs religious education for children, a child can decide by herself about participation
in religious instruction at the age of 14.
° 3 Of course the students are not graded according to their belief or their religious practice. Instead, the grade is based
on the student's general knowledge in the particular religion. See Maunz'Durig, supra note 242. Article 7 at 33.
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In summary, unlike in the United States, religion plays an important role in the public
school system in Germany. Religious instruction is part of the regular curriculum
according to Article 7 (3). and most public schools are interdenominational schools based
on the Christian faith. Even though their organization and structure is based on Christian
faith, the schools are not allowed to favor religion in a proselytizing manner in secular
subjects. Teachers in these schools may refer to the Christian faith as a "formative
cultural and educational factor which has developed in Western civilization" because
J£A
such a reference contains no message about the "truth of the belief."" The main task
German courts have to perform in this area is therefore to draw the line with regard to the
question of when a historical reference to the traditional role of Christianity in the
Western civilization becomes proselytizing. This distinction between permissible
affirmation of Christianity and missionary work is. as the cases discussed below will
show, not an easy task for the courts.
B. The School Prayer.
1. The School Prayer Issue In The United States.
In the United States the constitutionality of prayer in public schools has always been
controversial. Beginning in the early 1960s, courts in the United States faced challenges
to government composed prayers held at the beginning of each school day, daily
moments of silence, and non-denominational prayers at graduation ceremonies. These
challenges produced several U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which will be analyzed
individually in the following sections of this paper.
Kommers, supra note 224. at 477 (translation of a decision of the German Constitutional Court)
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a. The Constitutionality OfEveryday Prayers.
i. Engel v. Vitale.
Prior to the 1960s the daily morning prayer constituted the most common form of
practicing religion in public schools.
36?
Daily morning prayers in public schools existed
even before the Civil War but it was not until 1962 that the Supreme Court in Engel v.
Vitale
6
was faced with determining their constitutionality. Engel, together with nine
other parents, challenged a New York statute that allowed a daily prayer in public schools
and the reliance on this statute by a local school district. At the beginning of each school
day, every class had to recite the following prayer, which was composed by the State
Board of Regents in order to increase moral and spiritual training in public schools:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings
upon us. our parents, our teachers and our Country."369
The lower courts,370 as well as the New York Court of Appeals,371 upheld the statute
and the school board's practice on the ground that the pupils were not forced to join the
prayer if they or their parents objected to it. The Supreme Court, in contrast, found this
option not sufficient and concluded that this "clearly religious activity"" violated the
Establishment Clause. 7 Writing for the majority. Justice Black relied on historical
evidence to conclude that "[t]he First Amendment . . . tried to put an end to government
control of religion and of prayer." 3 3 Because government power to regulate religion is
365 William e. Griffiths. Religion, the courts, and the public schools 1 (1966).
366
See id. at 3 (referring to two cases in which the legality of these religious exercises in public schools had been
challenged).
367
Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
368
Id. at 422-23.
369
Id. at 422.
370
Engel v. Vitale. 191 N.Y.S. 2d 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) and Engel v. Vitale. 206 N.Y.S. 2d 183 (N.Y. App. Div.
1960).
371
372
Engel v. Vitale. 176N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1961).
Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421. 424 (1962).
373
See id at 425-437.
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always accompanied by dangers of religious persecution,37 the Framers of the
Constitution intended to erect a wall between the church and the state. As "[t]here can be
no doubt that New York's state prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs
embodied in the Regents' prayer," the prayer was unconstitutional despite its
denominational neutrality and the opt-out feature. Justice Black also rejected the
respondents' argument that invalidation of the prayer expressed an impermissible
hostility toward religion. ' In his view there was no hostility in saying "that each
separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or
sanctioning official prayers."3 ' Instead, such an interpretation of the Establishment
Clause properly left the responsibility for religious exercises "to the people themselves
and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance."377
The sole dissenter in Engel, Justice Stewart, found that the Court had "misapplied"
the principle of the Establishment Clause. Tracking the rationale of the New York
Court of Appeals/ Justice Stewart referred to the many references to God and religion
by government actors, including the Declaration of Independence, the inauguration
speeches of almost all Presidents of the United States, and the expression "In God we
trust," which has been engraved in American coins since 1865. 38 These acts of
government did not constitute an establishment of religion, and the prayer at issue did not
either. According to Justice Stewart, religion is not established by simply "letting those
who want to say a prayer say it." 81 He added that "to deny the wish of these school
374
Id. at 432.
375
Id at 434.
376
Id. at 435.
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Id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Engel v. Vitale. I76N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1961).
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Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 42 1 . 446-449 ( 1 962).
381
Id. at 445.
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children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the
spiritual heritage of our nation."
ii. School District Of Abington Township v. Schempp.
One year later in School District ofAbington Township v. Schempp; ' the Court ruled
on the constitutionality' of two school-prayer statutes, one from Maryland and one from
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania statute required that "[a]t least ten verses from the Holy
bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school
day"384 and permitted pupils to be excused from this religious exercise upon the written
request of their parents. 385 The Maryland statute, in contrast, did not prescribe the reading
of the Bible as mandatory but provided a legislative basis for the local Boards of
Education to adopt rules for religious opening exercises in public schools. Mrs. Murray
and her son 6 challenged the adoption of such a rule for religious opening exercises by
the Board of Education of Baltimore City', which prescribed to open each school day "by
the reading, without comment, of a chapter the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's
prayer."
387
The Supreme Court found that these religious practices violated the Establishment
TOO
Clause. Justice Clark, who delivered the majority opinion, conceded that "religion has
been closely identified with [the] history and government"3 9 and is therefore "strongly
382
Id. at 445.
383
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
384
Id. at 205 (citations omitted).
!S
This exemption was part of the statute when the plaintiffs challenged the statute for the first time in Schempp v.
School District of Abington Township. 177 F.Supp. 398 (DC Pa. 1959). While the appeal of this decision was pending
at the Supreme Court. Pennsylvania added the exemption. The Supreme Court, therefore, vacated judgment and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceeding. The District Court found again for the plaintiffs
(Schempp v. School District of Abington Township. 201 F.Supp. 815 (DC Pa. 1962) and the District, its officials and
the Superintendent appealed again to the Supreme Court. See School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203. 206 n.l (1963) and Griffiths, supra note 361. at 14-15 (providing more details about the case history).
80 From the book William J. Murray has written, it becomes clear that he actually did not want to challenge the prayer
himself, but that it was his mother who initiated everything. See William J. Murray. Let Us Pray 1-28 (1995).
387
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203. 211 (1963).
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imbedded in public and private life.*090 But he also reaffirmed the need for strict
protection of religious freedom, which has an equally important role in "public and
private life" as religion itself.
391
Seeking to resolve this conflict, he declared that the
government has to be neutral towards religion
392
and articulated a two-part test: "[T]o
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary neutral effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Applying this test to the statutes at issue, the Court concluded that, even though the state
had stated a secular legislative purpose, the principal purpose was clearly a religious
one.
39
The fact that the attendance was not mandatory, and that an excuse from the
religious exercise was possible upon request was, according to the Court, irrelevant.
Unlike in Free Exercise Clause cases coercion was not required for an Establishment
Clause violation. 39r>
As in Engel, Justice Stewart was the only dissenter. He refused to "assume that the
school boards lack the qualities of inventiveness and good will" to achieve "a system of
religious exercises that would meet the constitutional standard."
iii. Wallace v. Jaffree.
50*7
It was not until 1985 that the Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree again
encountered the constitutionality of a religious exercise in public schools at the beginning
of each day.398 Jaffree. on behalf of his children, challenged an Alabama statute that
391
Id. at 214. (stating that religion "has not been so identified with [the Nation's| history and government that religious
freedom is not likewise as strongly embedded in our public and private life.").
92
Id. at 215 (referring to an opinion by Judge Taft about the ideal relationship between government and religion).
393
Id. at 222 (citation omitted).
94
Id. at 224 (*'[T]he state's recognition of the pervading religious character of the ceremony is evident from the rule's
specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version as well as the recent amendment permitting
nonattendance at the exercise.").
395
Id. at 223.
396
Id at 320.
397
Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
398
It is therefore not correct to say that Court in this case had decided about the constitutionality of a moment of
silence statute. Only one of the three statutes that were originally challenged at the trial court established a moment of
72
allowed public schools to begin each school day with "a period of silence for meditation
or voluntary prayer.
,,3 9
Probably because of the "remarkable conclusion
1
* of the District
Court that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution would not block
Alabama from establishing a state religion,400 the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to
recall some basic principles of the freedoms protected by the First Amendment and their
applicability to the states.
401
Applying the Lemon test402 the Court held that the statute
was invalid because it clearly lacked any secular legislative purpose.
403 The record
showed that the statute was '"an effort to return voluntary prayer to the public schools."
This clear evidence for the plainly religious purpose of the statute made it unnecessary for
the Court to rule on whether a statute which simply provides a moment of silence without
any religious reason would be possible under the First Amendment. Justice Stevens, who
wrote the majority opinion, pointed out that the Court's holding did not prohibit students
from praying for themselves during the school day. 4(b Additionally. Justice O'Connor
406
J.07
and Justice Powell emphasized in their concurring opinions that a statute allowing a
moment of silence with no religiously motivated purpose could be constitutional. It is
therefore possible to conclude that a "true moment of silence law" would be upheld by
the Court.
408
silence at the beginning of each school day. This statute, which was held to be constitutional by the trial court was
challenged neither in the Court of Appeals nor in the Supreme Court. See Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38, 40-
48(1985): Nowak/Rotunda. supra note 14. §17.5. at 1269-70.
3,9
Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38. 41 (1985).
400
Jaffree v. Board of Education. 554 F.Supp. 1 104 (S.D.Ala. 1983) (holding the Alabama statute that allowed prayer
in public schools to be constitutional, because the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution would be inapplicable to
the states.) This holding was overturned by the Court of Appeals in Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d. 1526. 1535 (1 1' Cir.
1983). See also Nowak/Rotunda. supra note 14. §17.5. at 1269-70.
""'Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38, 48-55 (1985). The Court stated that although the First Amendment was originally
"adopted to curtail the power of Congress" it became applicable to the states with the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the state of Alabama is now as bound to grant and protect the freedoms of the First Amendment as
is the Congress of the United States.
40
~ Id. at 55: See also supra Part ll.B.2.b. (providing a detailed analvsis of the Lemon test).
403
Id. at 56.
04
Id. at 56. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 59.
405
407
Id at 62.
408 Nowak/Rotunda, supra note 14, §17.5. at 1270-71; Tribe, supra note 4, § 14-5, at 1 186.
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iv. Conclusion.
In summary, statutes that provide a moment of silence without any religious allusion
would most likely be constitutional. On the other hand, the First Amendment clearly
prohibits religious exercises in the form of a daily prayer in public schools. As the
Supreme Court has adhered to this view over the years.409 it is unlikely that it will change
in the future. Thus, the only possibility to establish daily prayers in public schools would
be through an amendment of the United States Constitution. Indeed, after the Court's
decisions in Schempp and Engel, forty-nine states demanded such a constitutional
amendment. Even though there was never enough support for such an amendment in
Congress, the idea of a school-prayer amendment has continued to attract attention.410
b. The Constitutionality OfPrayers At Graduation Ceremonies.
A shared characteristic of the three cases analyzed above is that each case involved a
prayer that occurred on a daily basis during the entirety of the student's education. As a
result, some school officials and religious groups concluded that a prayer at one single
occasion - namely the graduation ceremony - would be deemed constitutional
notwithstanding Engel and Schempp. In 1992. however, the Supreme Court rejected this
argument with its ruling in Lee v. Weisman.411 By a five-to-four vote, the Court held that
a school policy permitting prayers at a graduation was unconstitutional because it
violated the Establishment Clause.
412
409
Even in Lee v. Weisman. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). the case that can be seen as doctrinal turning point in Establishment
Clause cases {see supra Part II.B.2.C), the Court has referred to Engel and Schempp {See e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577. 588. 590, 596(1992)).
410 Church and State in American History 245 (John F. Wilson and Donald. L. Drakeman eds.. 2d ed. 1987 and
Mar) Ellen Quinn Johnson. Comment. School prayer and the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48 Md. L. Rev.
1018.1019 nn. 4 & 5 (1989); See generally Lynda Beck Fenwick. Should The Children Pray? 142-171 (1989)
(providing detailed information about the arguments and discussions in the U.S. Senate in 1984).
411
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
412
Id. at 599.
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i. Lee v. Weisman.
Daniel Weisman. the father of a girl who attended a public high school in Providence.
Rhode Island, challenged the school's practice of having a prayer at the graduation
ceremonies in public middle and high schools. According to the local school board's
policy, the school principal was required to invite a member of the clergy to deliver an
invocation and a benediction at the graduation ceremony. The clergy member was
instructed by the principal to proceed according to an official booklet containing
guidelines on how the prayer should be conducted. He was also instructed that the prayer
had to be non-sectarian.413 The District Court applied the Lemon test l4 and found it
violated. The prayer, although non-sectarian, had a religious character and thus had an
impermissible advancing effect on religion. 41 ^ The Supreme Court, by contrast, did not
rely on Lemon, but instead, based its ruling on the facts that (1) the government's
involvement with the prayer was so pervasive that it created "a state-sponsored and state
directed religious exercise in a public school,"
416
and (2) the student's attendance at the
ceremony was in a "fair and real sense obligatory"417 so that participation in a religious
exercise was in effect coerced. The petitioners' argument that the student's attendance at
the ceremony was not mandatory was rejected by the Court as being too formalistic:
Attendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a
student is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real
sense of the term "voluntary," for absence would require forfeiture of those
intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all
her high school years.
418
411
Id. at 580-86; See also Thomas A. Schweitzer. The progeny ofLee v. Weisman: Can student-invited prayer at
public school graduations still be constitutional ' 9 BYU Pub. L. 291, 292-293 (1995).
414
Lee v. Weisman, 728 F. Supp. 68 ( 1 990).
415
See id. at 71 -72. According to the Court, the school board's practice of including prayers in a graduation ceremony,
even if they were non-sectarian, created the impression of governmental identification with the religious practice. This
effect would endorse or even advance religion and thus violate the Establishment Clause.
416
Id. at 577, 587.
4,7
Id at 577, 586.
418
Id. at 577, 595.
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In his dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia sought to place the issue of prayers at
graduation ceremonies in historical context.419 Referring to the fact that even the Framers
of the Constitution had tolerated prayers at ceremonies of all three branches of
government," he concluded that they would also have tolerated prayers at graduation
ceremonies. To support his position. Justice Scalia referred to Marsh v. Chambers in
which the Supreme Court had held that prayers at the opening of legislative sessions were
constitutional because this practice was "[f]rom our Nation's origin a prominent part of
governmental ceremonies and proclamations.**4" The majority opinion did not consider
Marsh a controlling precedent because of the differences that marked legislative sessions
and public school systems particularly in light of the youth and impressionability of
students. Moreover, in the majority's view, a close examination of the historical facts
revealed that the Framers most likely would have opposed a graduation prayer at a public
school.
423
ii. The Aftermath Of Lee v. Weisman.
Because of the Court's narrow and fact-based holding.424 the decision in Lee did not
solve the question whether any kind of prayer at high school graduation ceremonies is
unconstitutional. As a result scholars today disagree about the constitutionality of prayers
419
Id at 63 1-632.
420
Id. at 633-35.
421
Id. at 532 (referring to Marsh v. Chambers. 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
422
Id. at 633.
423
Id. at 620-627 (Souter. J., concurring); See generally Myron Schreck. Balancing the right to pray at graduation
and the responsibility o] disestablishment. 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1869. 1871-1872 (1995). for an analysis of the debate
over the intent of the framers in this case. See also Michael Swomiey. Myths about voluntary school prayer, 35
Washburn L.J. 294. 294-295 (1996) (examining the intent of the fathers of the declaration of independence).
424
Lee v. Weisman. 505 U.S. 577. 586 (1992) ("These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our
decision:'*).
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425
at graduation ceremonies, " and the body of case law in the lower courts on this issue is
inconsistent.
4"6
In American Civil Liberties Union ofNew Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board
ofEducation. ~ for example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had to deal with
a school board policy that allowed students to decide on (1 ) the way a graduation-prayer
would be conducted. (2) the content of the prayer if the class decided to have one and (3)
who should deliver the prayer. In 1993, a referendum led to the following result: 128
students voted for a prayer. 120 voted for a moment of silence, and 20 voted to have
neither. "" The Third Circuit found that the school board's policy violated the
Establishment Clause because the freedom of religion protected by that clause could not
be determined by a majority vote: "The First Amendment does not allow the state to erect
a policy that only respects religious views that are popular because the largest majority
cannot be licensed to impose its religious preferences upon the smallest minority.'* *"' In
addition, the Third Circuit found that the policy to allow the students to vote was just a
way to elude the consequences of the Supreme Court's decision in Lee. Judge McKee,
who wrote the majority opinion, applied the same criteria on which the Supreme Court
had based its holding in Lee, and found that the state's control of the graduation
ceremony as well as the students' coerced participation was also present in this case.
Also applying the Lemon test, the court also found that the sole purpose of the policy was
*" See Thomas A. Schweitzer. The Progeny ofLee v. Weisman: Can student-invited pravers at public school
graduation ceremonies still he constitutional 9 . 9 BYU J. Pub. L. 29! n. 4 & 5 (1995) (referring to various articles in
which the authors had concluded that the Court in Lee had "outlawed any form of prayer at public school
graduations.") Professor Schweitzer himself believes that "graduation school prayer can be constitutional under
carefully controlled circumstances.'* Id. at 306.
426
Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd.. 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D.F!a.l994): Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.. 977 F.
2d 963 (5
th
Cir. 1992). cert denied. 505 U.S. 1215(1993); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. .Supp. 1473.
1479. 1488 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
27
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Board of Education. 84 F. 3d 1471 (3 rd Cir.
1996).
428
Id at 1474-76.
A2q
Id. at 1488
430
Id. at 1478-83 (finding, among other things, that the delegation of this delicate aspect of the graduation ceremony to
the students neither released the school board from the duties set forth in the Establishment Clause nor eliminated the
presence of state control at the ceremonv ).
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not to provide the students with more rights to free speech, but to elude the certain
unconstitutionality of prayers at graduation which were ordered by school officials.
Thus, the policy lacked a secular purpose. In addition, the challenged policy had the
effect of advancing religion and therefore violated the principle of governmental
neutrality. " Because the policy neither passed the Lemon test nor the principles of
endorsement or coercion established in Lee, the Third Circuit concluded that the policy
must be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.43
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 4 4 presented facts similar to those
in Black Horse Pike but produced a different result. Just like in Black Horse Pike, the
school board resolution ( 1 ) allowed the senior class to decide on whether they wanted to
have a prayer and (2) required that the prayer should be delivered by a student
volunteer.
43
'^ Viewing the Establishment Clause analysis as a "delicate and fact sensitive
one,
,v436
the Fifth Circuit applied all five tests
437
that the Supreme Court has used in its
Establishment Clause cases and found that under all five tests the resolution was in line
with the Establishment Clause. Using the Lemon test, the court found a secular purpose in
the school board's intent to solemnize the graduation ceremony
438
and held that the
primary effect of the resolution was not to advance religion but to solemnize the
ceremony. In addition, the Fifth Circuit found that there was no endorsement of religion
by the school officials, just as there was no endorsement when a public school allowed a
Christian club to meet on school property after class along with all other student
41
" Supra note 5 1 at 1484-1485.
4,:
Id. at 1488 (finding that a policy that "seeks to accommodate the preferences of some at the expense of others and
thereby crosses the required line of neutrality.").
433
Id. at 1488.
4,4 977 F. 2d 963 (5 th Cir. 1992) cert, denied. 505 U.S. 1215 (1993).
435
Id. at 965.
4,6
Id. at 966 n.8 (citing Lee v. Weisman and Lynch v. Donelly).
437
The court here split! the Lemon test into three parts( secular purpose, primary effect and entanglement) and added
the two criteria used in Lee v. Weisman (coercion and endorsement).
438 977 F.2d 963. 966 (5
th
Cir. 1992).
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organizations.
4 The Fifth Circuit found neither a coercion nor an excessive
entanglement of the government in religious matters. Unlike in Lee, the decision about
the prayer was made by the senior class. As to government entanglement, the court stated:
"[T]he resolution keeps Clear Creek free of all involvement with religious
institutions.
,,44
° Finally the Court found that there was "less psychological pressure on the
student than ... in Lee" because the prayer was delivered by a fellow student and because
the students had the right to vote on that issue.441 Because the School board policy passed
all five possible Establishment Clause tests, the Court concluded that "a majority of
A A")
students can do what the state acting on its own cannot do." ~ that is. they could not
conduct a religious exercise at an official public school event.
In conclusion, even though both decisions were based on nearly the same facts, the
end result was completely different. Other courts in the United States have likewise
disagreed about whether graduation prayers are constitutional
44
or invalid. In 1993,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Jones.445 but this decision under governing rules
neither indicates approval of the result of Jones nor transforms Jones into a binding
precedent for all national courts.
446
Thus, the constitutionality of prayers at public school
graduation ceremonies remains unresolved and is treated differently across the nation.
439
See Board of Education of Westside Community School v. Mergens. 496 U.S. 226, 247-53 (1990).
440
Id at 968.
441 Mat 971.
442
Id at 972.
443
Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Distr.. 864 F. Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Adler v. Duval County School
Board. 851 F.Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994): Griffith v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Kan. 1992).
444 Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist.. 608 F.Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985): Sands v. Morongo Unified School
Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991 ); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40. 719 P.2d 875 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Harris v.
Joint School District No. 241. 41 F.3d 447 (9
th
Cir. 1994).
44,5
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 505 U.S. 1215 ( 1993).
446
The Court itself has often emphasized that the denial of certiorari can neither be seen as a decision on the merits nor
does it establish a binding precedent. See United States v. Carver. 260 U.S. 482. 490 ( 1923): Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show. 338 U.S. 912, 917-19 (1950); See generally P. Bator et. AL., HART& WECHSLER'S The FEDERAL
Courts and the Federal System 1855 (3d ed. 1988).
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2. School Prayer In Germany.
While in the United States the issue of prayer in public school has been disputed for a
long time and still remains unsolved today, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany
resolved this issue in 1979 in a clear and comprehensive manner447 that contrasts sharply
with the United States Supreme Court's approach. 448 In its decision, the Federal
Constitutional Court combined two lower court decisions, both of which dealt with the
constitutionality of a prayer held outside of religious instruction in compulsory state
i , 449
schools.
The first case was brought by a father whose children attended a public
interdenominational school in the state of Hesse. It was customary in this school to start
each school day with an interdenominational prayer which was recited by the children
and their teachers. The Hesse Constitutional Court found this practice to be constitutional
unless a parent or pupil objected to it.430 Since the freedom of religion not only includes
the freedom to believe and to practice religion, but also the freedom of not believing or
not practicing religion, a pupil would be deprived of his religious freedom if he were
required to pray despite his beliefs.
The German Constitutional Court, however, reversed this decision.451 According to
the Court the freedom of religion has two components, both of which are equally
protected and restricted: The freedom not to have any religious belief and not to practice
religion has the same scope of protection as the freedom to believe and to practice
religion.
4 "^ 2
The former freedom, however, may not prevent the exercise of the latter
447
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Cosntitutional Court] [BV'erfG] 52. 223 (1979) For a
translation of this case, see Kommers. supra note 224. at 466-472.
448 See supra Part IV.B.l.
449
Id. at 224. (The Federal Constitutional Court can, just as the Supreme Court, combine lower court cases that have a
similar factual background and that are dealing with the same constitutional issues in one single decision. See e.g..
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (deciding about School District v. Abington
Township v. Schempp. 201 F.Supp. 815 (DC Pa. 1962) and about Murray v. Curlett. 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 1962).).
450
Entscheidung des Hessischen Staatsgerichtshofs [Constitutional Court of Hesse] [ESVGH] 16,1 (1965).
451
Id. at 235.
452
Id. at 251.
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freedom. In order to solve this conflict, it is necessary to balance the competing freedoms
and to find an acceptable scope for each of them.453 The Court found that it would easily
be possible for the pupils who do not want to pray to remain silent and not to participate
in the prayer or to leave the classroom to avoid any encounter with religion. Even though
there might theoretically be the danger that such behavior could put a pupil in an outsider
position, the Court did not consider this danger to be concrete enough to outweigh the
rights of the pupils who wished to pray. For this reason the Federal Constitutional Court
reversed the judgment of the Hesse Constitutional Court and held that a prayer in
interdenominational public schools is constitutional, even if the parents or a pupil object
to it, so long as they are free to decide about their own participation in the prayer.
4?4
The second case that the Federal Constitutional Court decided in this combined
decision arose out of a complaint brought by a father whose daughter objected to a prayer
conducted at a public interdenominational school in Aachen. Responding to the claim
both the Administrative Court of Aachen and the Court of Appeals of North-
Rhine/Westphalia prohibited the prayer based on the "negative freedom of
confession. '
_;>
The highest administrative court of Germany, however, reversed the
judgment on the ground that the "negative freedom of confession" would not hinder a
prayer at a interdenominational state school,
4 ^6
and the Federal Constitutional Court
upheld this judgment.457 The Federal Constitutional Court emphasized that Article 7 (3)
of the Basic Law gives the state a broad right to establish different types of schools,
including interdenominational schools.
4
" Because a prayer is not part of the official
453
Id. at 251 (stating that a balance between both conflicting rights must take into account the basic principle of
tolerance).
454
Id. at 223 (the German original reads as follows: "'Das Schulgebet ist grundsatzlich auch dann verfassungsrechtlich
unbedenklich. wenn ein Schiiler oder dessen Eltem der Abhaltung des Gebets widersprechen: deren Grundrecht auf
negative Bekenntnisfreiheit wird nicht verletzt. wenn sie frei und ohne Zwange iiber die Teilnahme am Gebet
entscheiden konnen.'*).
455
Id. at 229-230.
56
Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [Highest Administrative Court] [BVerwGE] 44, 196 ( 1973).
57
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfG] 52. 223 at 235 (1979).
458
Id. at 236 (referring to the former decisions: BVerfGE 41. 29: BVerfGE 41. 65 and BVerfGE 41. 88).
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curriculum of these schools, the participation is voluntary and not compulsory.4 ' By
including the prayer as a part of the regular school day, the state identifies itself with a
certain religious belief. Article 7 of the Basic Law, however, allows a connection
between state and church in the educational system to a certain degree.460 If the parents,
students and teacher, therefore, wish to exercise their religious freedom by beginning
each school day with a prayer, they may do so.461 The "negative freedom of confession"
of objectors may not prevent the prayer unless the objector has to face an unbearable
burden by being exposed to the prayer or will encounter adverse consequences because of
her non-participation.
462 A student may get into an outsider position because of his non-
participation in the prayer. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Federal
Constitutional Court did not consider discrimination against non-participating students as
very likely to occur if the prayer is only held at the beginning of each school day.
According to the Court, in most cases it is sufficient that the teacher explains to the other
children the reason why the student does not want to pray and that his behavior is not
"strange."
464
Moreover, the court continued, the dangers for a student to become an
outsider if he does not participate in the prayer are the same as the consequences he
encounters when he does not to participate in the religious instruction and in the latter
case the Constitution specifically permits the non-participation. ^ It must also be taken
into account that today in many classes the religious affiliation of the students is so
diverse that non-participation in religious instruction and in the school-prayer is a
common phenomenon. Thus, it is very unlikely that only one student will be placed in an
460
See supra Part IV.A.2.
461
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts f Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfC] 52. 223 at 240-41.
462
Id. at 249.
465
Id. at 252 (the German original reads as follows:"Der nicht am Schulgebet teilnehmende Schiller wird regelmaBig
auch den Religionsunterricht nicht besuchen. Hier setzt das Grundgesetz in Art. 7 Abs. 2 ersichtlich voraus. daB es . .
zu keiner Diskriminierung kommt.).
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outsider position where he has to face severe consequences.466 Nevertheless, the Federal
Constitutional Court recognized that there may be rare cases in which the prayer may
unduly burden a student ~ for example, if the student is emotionally weak and the teacher
is not able to successfully mediate between the student and the class.
467
In these rare
cases, according to the Court, it is necessary to prohibit the prayer in order to protect the
"negative freedom of religion" of the individual student. 6
C. Religious Symbols In Public Schools.
1. Religious Symbols In Public Schools In The United States.
The debate over whether the display of religious symbols in public schools is
constitutional has not been dealt with as extensively as the issue of prayers at public
schools,
469
so that there are far fewer cases dealing with this issue. This paper will limit
its analysis to the only case the Supreme Court has decided in this area, the 1980 decision
in Stone v. Graham 470 There the Supreme Court invalidated a Kentucky statute that
required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public
school classroom. Contrary to the holdings of the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Kentucky. a majority of the Supreme Court justices found, in a per curiam opinion,
that the statute lacked a secular purpose
472
and thus violated the first part of the Lemon
test.
4
The statute required that each copy of the Ten Commandments had to bear the
following explanatory notation: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is
clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
Id. at 252.
Id at 253.
Id at 253.
59
Various books and articles, for example, deal with the issue of prayer at public school, while almost no article can
be found about the display of religious symbols in public schools. For a list of relevant articles and books see the
Bibliography at the end.
470
Stone v. Graham. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
471
Stone v. Graham. 599 S.W. 2d 157 (1980).
472
Stone v. Graham. 449 U.S. 39. 41.
473
Id at 43.
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Common Law of the United States."474 This simple notification, however, was not
enough proof for a majority of the Justices, that the statute had a secular purpose.
Referring to Schempp, the Court concluded that "[t]he pre-eminent purpose for posting
the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature" because
"[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian
faiths.
"*75 The dissenters, on the other hand, saw the legislative notification in another
light. While Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun would have given the case
plenary consideration,
476
Justice Stewart dissented from the summary reversal of the
lower courts" decisions because he found that, according to the facts presented to the
Supreme Court, "the courts of Kentucky . . . [had] applied wholly correctly constitutional
criteria in reaching their decision."
4 7
In a separate dissent. Justice Rehnquist pointed out
that the Court had never before rejected the legislature's clearly stated secular purpose in
such a simple and superficial manner.
4,8
Referring to Schempp and other precedents, he
pointed out that the Court had always either accepted the stated secular legislative intent
or had questioned it in a more detailed manner.479
2. Religious Symbols In Germany's Public Schools.
Unlike in the United States, the display of religious symbols in public schools in
Germany recently has led to heated discussions.480 The issue gained much attention in
1995. when the Federal Constitutional Court invalidated a Bavarian law which required
474
Id. at 39 n. 1
.
475 Wat 41.
476
Id. at 43 (Burger. Ch.J. and Blackmun. J., concurring).
477
Id at 43.
478
Id at 43.
479
Id at 43-47.
John E Coons points out that very few decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court have received so much media
attention as the Crucifix Case. See John E. Coons. OfCrucifixes and Community, in Verfassungsstaatlichkeit,
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the posting of a cross or crucifix
481
on the wall of each public school classroom.
482 On
behalf of their three children, a married couple challenged this law. arguing that the
display of a cross (or. even more pointedly a crucifix because of its portrayal of a
suffering man) would influence their children's perception of the Christian faith in a
proselytizing way. The plaintiffs filed their action in the Administrative Court of
Regensburg seeking a preliminary injunction that the cross should be removed from the
classroom during the pendency of the action. The administrative court, however, denied
this injunction for two reasons.483 First, it is said that because the cross was only a
symbol on the wall and not part of the regular classes, it had no proselytizing function.
Second, the Court emphasized that religion and education are not strictly separated in
Germany. The court reasoned in particular that because it is constitutional for the state to
establish interdenominational schools,
4 4
which are not required to act with complete
neutrality towards religion, these schools may put up religious symbols in classrooms.
Referring to the principle of tolerance and the holding of the Federal Constitutional Court
in the School Prayer case,
486
the administrative court found that the plaintiffs' right to
remove the cross from the classroom, based on a "negative freedom of confession", could
not be superior to a "positive freedom of religion" of other students who wanted the cross
in the classroom.
487
" The difference between a cross and a crucifix is that the latter is a portrayal of Jesus Christ dying on the cross.
8
~ Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 93. 1 (1995).
483
Verwaltungsgericht Regensburg [administrative court of Regensburg] [VGRegensburg] in Bayrisches
Verwaltungsblatt [BayVBI] 1991. 345.
484
See e.g Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 41. 29
(constitutionality of interdenominational public schools in Baden-Wurttemberg): 41. 65 (constitutionality of
interdenominational public schools in Bavaria): 41. 88 (constitutionality of interdenominational public school in
North-Rhine/Westphalia).
w
Verwaltungsgericht Regensburg [administative court of Regensburg] [VGRegensburg] in Bayrisches
Verwaltungsblatt [BayVBI] 1991. 345 at 346.
486
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional CourtJ [BVerfGE] 52. 223. See Part
IV. B. 2.. for an analysis of this case.
Verwaltungsgericht Regensburg (administrative court of Regensburg] [VGRegensburg] in Bayrisches
Verwaltungsblatt [BayVBI] 1991. 345 at 345-46.
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While the court of appeals affirmed the administrative court's decision.488 the Federal
Constitutional Court reversed the judgment by a 5 to 3 margin.489 The Court reasoned
that in combination with compulsory' attendance in school, the display of a cross in the
classroom violated the children's right of negative religious freedom, that is the right to
believe in nothing.
490
This right, according to the Court, outweighed the "negative
freedom of belief * of the others for a variety of reasons.4 '
First, the Court reasoned that the children were exposed to the cross for a long and
intense period because they must spend much of their daily time in the classroom. While
it is often possible to avoid confrontation with religious symbols in day-to-day life, it is
impossible for children to avoid confrontation with a cross in a classroom.
492
Hence, the
display of a cross in a classroom rendered the "positive freedom of belief* superior to the
"negative freedom of belief" in a way that unduly burdened the plaintiffs' freedom of
i
•
• 493
religion.
Second, by enacting a statute that required the posting of a cross in every school
room, the state had overstepped the line of permissible accommodation of religion in the
school system set forth by Article 7 of the Basic Law. Even though
interdenominational schools may refer to the Christian faith as a major factor for the
cultural and educational development of Germany, they may not post Christian symbols
for a merely proselytizing reason. The cross is generally seen as a distinctive and
representative sign of the Christian religion
4 ?
and the erection of a cross often represents
88
Bayrischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof [Bavarian Higher Administrative Court][BayVGHj in Neuste
Verwaltungsrechtszeitschrift [NVwZ] 1991, 1099.
89
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 93. 1 at 13 ( 1995).
490
Id. at 18.
4<
^
Id. at 22-24.
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Id. at 18 (distinguishing this situation from an earlier decision in which the Court had held the display of a cross in
the court room to be constitutional).
493
494
49<i
Id. at 19 (the German original reads as follows: "Das Kreuz gehort nach wie vor zu den spezifischen
Glaubenssymbolen des Christentums. Es ist geradezu sein Glaubenssymbol schlechthin.").
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a symbol of identification with the Christian religion. Thus, the display of a cross in a
classroom will convey a message of the school's identification with the Christian
religion, which the Court found to constitute impermissible proselytizing.
The three dissenting judges, on the other hand, found that the cross was not only a
sign of the Christian religion, but also a symbol reflecting German tradition. According
to them, the display of a cross in a classroom was not proselytizing, but simply a
reference to the Christian tradition of Germany.498 Thus, according to the dissent, the law
requiring the posting of a cross in every classroom was constitutional.
This decision of the Federal Constitutional Court to invalidate the Bavarian law that
required the posting of a cross raised a great deal of criticism. Many scholars and
politicians accused the Federal Constitutional Court of having misinterpreted
fundamental constitutional principles by providing absolute protection to the "negative
freedom of religion" and thus rendering the "negative freedom of religion" superior to the
"positive freedom of religion.""^ Others expressed their fear that the Federal
Constitutional Court would abandon the fundamental church-state relationship and
emphasized that the Nazis began their disestablishment of the church-state relationship
with the removal of the crosses from all public school rooms, 54 years earlier. Only
four months after the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court was rendered, the
Bavarian government adopted a new law. in order to keep the crosses within the public
schools.^
01
This new law also mandated the posting of a cross at the classroom wall, but.
496
Id. at 20 (arguing that the students would be more likely to follow the Christian belief if the school identifies itself
with the Christian faith).
497
Id. at 32.
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verfassungsrechtlicher unzulassiger Weise missionarisch beinfluBt.").
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Bavarian Educational Law] [BayEUG] art. 7 111 (1995).
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unlike the law that was invalidated by the Federal Constitutional Court, it states that if
children or parents object to the cross the cross it must be removed. The constitutionality
of this law already has been challenged, but the Bavarian Constitutional Court and the
Highest Administrative Court of Germany upheld the law because of the option it gives
to non-believers to remove the symbol. 502
In summary, the mandatory display of a cross in public schools in Germany is
considered to be unconstitutional, unless there is a possibility for removal in case
students or parents object to the display. 50 " The result would be the same for all other
religious symbols that can be considered to have a proselytizing effect. Thus, a case like
Stone v. Graham, would have had the same outcome in Germany. Just as in the
German Crucifix case, the Kentucky state statute required the posting of religious
symbols in public schools without granting an exemption to parents or students who
wished to remove them. Faced with such a case the Federal Constitutional Court would
have invalidated the law on the same grounds on which it had invalidated the Bavarian
law that required the posting of the cross. 505
Indeed, even the dissenters in the Crucifix case would have joined in the majority
opinion. The reason for their dissent was been that the cross has played an important role
in historical and cultural development. 506 Thus, they argued, the display of a cross in the
public school room was not proselytizing, but only a reference to the important role the
Christian faith had played in German historical development. The Ten Commandments.
02
Bayrischer Verfassungsgerichtshof [Bavarian Constitutional Court] [BayVerfGH] in Neuste Juristische
Wochenzeitung [NJW] 3157 (1997): Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Highest Administrative Court] [BVerfG] 6 C 18.98.
See also Robert Probst. Das Kruzifix-Gesetz ist verfassungskonform, SUDDEUTSCHE Zeitung, April 22. 1999. at L-8.
13 The only exception from this general principle is the denominational public school, which would allow every
identification of the school with the religious belief. See Johannes Rux. Bekenntnisfreifwit in der Schule, DER Staat
523.533(1996).
504
Stone v. Graham. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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See John E. Coons. OfCrucifixes and Communities, in Verfassungsstaatlichkeit. Festschrift fur Klaus
Stern zum 65. Geburtstag. 927. 931 (Joachim Burmeister et al. eds., 1997) (making the argument vice versa that the
Supreme Court would have decided the Crucifix Case the way they decided Stone v. Graham).
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Entscheidungen des Bundcsverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 93. 1, 32-33 (1995).
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however, have not had a significant role in the historical development of Germany. From
a German point of view the posting of the Ten Commandments is considered to have an
even more proselytizing character than the posting of a cross: The cross is sometimes
seen as a sign of peace and blessing or as a sign of charity, as is the case with the Red
Cross,
50
' whereas the Ten Commandments on the other hand do not have such a
perceived secular meaning at all. As a result, a law requiring the mandatory posting of the
Ten Commandments without an exemption for cases in which students or parents object
to the display would be unconstitutional under the German Basic Law. A voluntary
unanimous decision by students, parents and school authorities to post the Ten
Commandments, on the contrary, would be constitutional in Germany, even though
probably unacceptable in the United States. The same would be true for all other religious
symbols even if they are not symbols of the Christian faith. According to the Federal
Constitutional Court, the public schools — regardless of whether they are non-
denominational or Christian interdenominational — have to be neutral towards other
religious beliefs in the sense that they tolerate these other religious beliefs.' Hence, if
most students in a class are Muslims the school may post a picture of Mekka on the
classroom wall, so long as no one objects to it.509
In the light of the Crucifix case, the general principle concerning the posting of
religious symbols in public schools can be stated as followed: If everybody — parents,
their children, and the school authorities — agree on the permanent display of a religious
symbol in the public school classroom, they may do so. In contrast, in the United States,
while jurisdictional rules might complicate a challenge to such a practice, the agreed-to
07
Christoph Link. Stat Crux 7 Neuste Juristische Wochenzeitschrift [MJW] 353. 3355 (1995).
08
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court] [BVerfGE] 41. 29. See also
Kommf.rs. supra note 224. at 477 (providing a translation of the German decision).
w
See Wolfgang Huber, Christliche Kirchen habe keinen Monopolanspruch, SUDDEUTESCHE ZEITUNG, August, 17.
1995. Bishop Huber suggests that in a public school in Berlin where most of the students are Muslims a picture of
Mekka should be placed next to the cross to show the schools acceptance of both religions.
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display of religious symbols in public schools would be unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause.
D. Free Exercise Right Of Teachers In Public Schools.
1. Free Exercise Rights Of Teachers In U.S. Public Schools.
The government may impede the free exercise of religion by teachers primarily in two
ways.
! The first is by prescribing to the teacher what he/she should teach or not teach. If
a biology teacher's religion, for example, disfavors birth control in general, a conflict
with his religious belief will arise if he has to discuss the different methods of birth
control with his class. 511 In such a situation, however, the teacher certainly may not
change the content of the curriculum according to his religious beliefs. To give him such
a power over the curriculum "would make the teacher the ultimate arbiter" of the
performance of his duties and of what the children will learn." 1
!
Thus, his professional
and contractual duties clearly outweigh any personal religious based right to determine
the curriculum. 513
There is. however, a second question: Can the teacher, while not seeking to change
the curriculum, seek to be excused from teaching certain material in violation of personal
religious mandates. This question whether a public school teacher should be obliged to
teach contrary to his religious beliefs is more difficult to solve and cases in this area are
very complicated and fact-sensitive. Nevertheless the proper answer in the majority of
cases, concerning the question whether a teacher is required to teach contrary to his
10
For other situations in which a conflict between the free exercise right of the teacher and the school may arise see.
Griffith. Religion. The Courts, and the Public schools 197-203 (1966).
" See Howard O. Hunter. Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, in
25 Wm and Mary L.Rev. 1. 23 (1983).
512
Id. at 58-59.
513
Id. at 59. See also e.g.. Webster v. New Lenox School District. 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
teacher's First Amendment rights were not violated when he was prohibited from teaching a non-evolutionary theory
of creation).
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religious belief, will most likely be a negative one. The essential principle - although
subject to some limitations - is that: "Public employment cannot be predicated on the
surrender of the individual's constitutional rights."'
514
Following this principle, the
Second Circuit has held that a school teacher is excused from participation in patriotic
activities because of his religious convictions. 5 l5 The court referred to decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, which in a related context had held that a teacher would
not be compelled to relinquish his First Amendment rights simply because of his position
as a public school employee. 516 The court, however, also recognized the teacher's
important function in the educational process of the children and the school's interest in
maintaining the flag salute program. 517 The exercise of First Amendment rights by the
teacher should therefore not be likely to "threaten the essential functions" of the school
c I y
system." Thus, it is necessary to balance the legitimate state interest in maintaining the
flag salute program against the First Amendment freedoms of the individual. 5 In
balancing these interests the court found that the school board had the right to enforce
regulations which were intended to secure the success of the flag salute program, but that
"such regulations must be narrowly drawn for precision of regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms."" In this case the
Second Circuit found that the Board of education had failed to provide such narrow
regulations and as a result had not "met the test of constitutional exactness required by
the First Amendment." ~ The behavior of the teacher during the flag salute - she was
standing in respectful silence with her hand at her sides - did not endanger the state's flag
Id. at 67 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education. 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
Russo v. Central School District No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 631 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 385 U.S. 589 (1970) and Pickering v. Board of Education. 391
U.S. 563(1968)).
517
Id. at 633.
SI8 W at 631.
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Id. at 632. (referring to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 268 (1967).
520
Id. at 632 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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Id. at 633.
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salute program in any way. 22 As a result, her dismissal was unjustified and violated her
First Amendment rights. " There is a serious question whether the result in this case
would change in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. 524 It is quite possible,
however, that the Smith rule does not control this situation. Rather, as with Yoder, 525 the
case may present a "hybrid" free-exercise-and-free-speech problem that permits
recognition of a religious exemption to a generally applicable rule.
The same arguments can be made for the teachers who refuse to teach contrary to
their religious convictions. In these cases however, the furtherance of the students's
education and the students right of education according to the curriculum set forth by the
state" are strong and legitimate governmental interests which may well outweigh the
teacher's First Amendment rights in some cases. If it is possible for the local school
board to replace the teacher for this particular subject, the importance of the First
Amendment rights would certainly require such an action. " On the other hand, in some
cases, it might be necessary for the teacher to continue teaching even contrary to his
religious belief if the governmental interest outweighs his Free Exercise Right. Because
cases in this area are very fact sensitive, it is not possible to provide one clear and
comprehensive solution. Instead these cases must be decided on a case by case basis,
balancing the governmental interest in the furtherance of the education of the children
against the teacher's free exercise rights.
In addition, it is beyond doubt that a teacher may neither give religious instruction nor
incorporate religious statements into his regular lessons.
528
Because a teacher, in the eyes
522
Id at 633.
523
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524 Employment Divisions Department. Human Resources v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 875 (1990).
525
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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This right is based on the "right to know" which was granted to the students in many court decisions. See Hunter.
supra note 5 1 1 . at 34 n. 1 4 1
.
- Hunter, supra note 5 1 1 , at 69.
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See Griffith, Religion, The Courts, and the Public schools at 194-95 (1966) (referring to two lower court
decisions which prohibited the teacher from engaging in religious activities while performing his public-school duties).
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of the pupils, represents the school, a religious statement would be seen as a religious
statement of the government. The wall of separation between church and state, however,
prohibits the identification of government with a religious belief, and therefore the
principle of non-establishment would supersede the teachers free exercise right in these
cases.
Another context in which conflicts between the free exercise right of the teacher and
the neutrality of the public school system towards religion may arise concerns the
wearing of religious garb. The Supreme Court of Oregon, for example, reversed a
decision of the Court of Appeals that had set aside the revocation of the teaching
certificate of a teacher who wore, in compliance with religious dictates, white clothes and
a white turban.
525
* The revocation of the license had been based on an Oregon statute that
prohibited teachers from wearing religious dresses "while engaged in the performance of
duties as a teacher" and also stated that the violation of this prohibition shall lead to the
suspension and the revocation of the teacher's teaching certificate. 53 : The Supreme Court
rejected the respondent's argument that the law was unconstitutional under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Even though the Oregon statute was not
religiously neutral but rather discriminatory against certain religions that required specific
dress code, the compelling government interest in securing the children's free exercise
right and the neutrality of the public schools towards religion was superior. 531 Moreover,
as the prohibition on wearing religious dress applied only to the exercise of teaching
functions, the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that the statute did "not impose an
impermissible requirement for teaching in the public schools."
5
29 Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J, 723 P.2d. 298 (Or. 1986).
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Id. at 309-310.
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A similar case was decided in 1990 by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Like Oregon. Pennsylvania had enacted a statute that prohibited teaching in religious
dress in public schools." Alima Delores Reardon, a Muslim, was employed as a
substitute teacher in the Philadelphia school district. Beginning in 1984, she was told by
the school principals that she could not teach in her religious clothes. Upon her refusal to
comply with this requirement she was not allowed to teach. According to the Court of
Appeals, the preservation of religious neutrality in public schools was a compelling
government interest that justified the enactment of a religiously discriminatory law.
53
In conclusion, the wearing of religious garb can be prohibited by state statute,
according to the lower court authorities that have addressed this question. The free
exercise right of the teacher is subject to strict limitations in this area because of the need
for strict neutrality in public school systems, where young children often take their
teacher as an example. Thus, just as a teacher may not provide religious instruction while
performing his school duties, the teacher may be banned from sending out a religion-
affirming message by wearing religious dress while teaching.
2. The Free Exercise Right Of Teachers In Public Schools In Germany.
Article 7 (3) of the Basic Law provides for religious instruction in public schools.
Therefore, in contrast to the situation in the United States, a teacher in Germany is
allowed to provide religious instruction. This "positive" right to teach religion
logically corresponds to the "negative" right of refusal to teach religious material.
Although the right of the teacher to refrain from religious teaching can be derived from
the general right of religious freedom, the Basic Law expressly states in Article 7 (3) that
United States v. Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia, 91 1 F.2d 882 (3
rd
Cir.. 1990).
534
Id at 885.
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Id at 893.
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See Maunz/Durig. supra note 242. Article 7. at 33.
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"[t]eachers may not be obliged to give religious instruction against their will." A
discrimination against the teacher because of this refusal would thus be unconstitutional.
It is possible, however, to transfer the teacher who refuses to engage in religious teaching
to another school for organizational reasons.
!>38
The right to teach religion is limited to religion classes. Thus, outside of religion
classes a teacher may not offer religious instruction.^ 39 He may for cultural or historical
reasons refer to certain religious beliefs, but he may not advocate a certain religious belief
or influence the pupil in a proselytizing manner.
540
The freedom of religion also allows
the teacher not to participate in any religious activity, such as a school prayer.
541
Whether a teacher may wear religious garb while performing his official school duties
has already been decided for the religious garb of the Bhagwan sect, a red dress and a
necklace with the picture of Baghwan Shree Rajnesh, the so-called Mala.M" In 1986 the
court of appeals in Munich and Hamburg held that the wearing of such a dress in a public
school would be unconstitutional." According to the courts, the teacher's free exercise
right is limited when he is performing his duties as a elementary public school teacher.
Public schools have to be neutral towards all religions, and they are not allowed to
proselytize their pupils.
544
The teacher, as a representative of the school must also act
neutrally towards all religions. This was found to be especially true for elementary' public
schools, because very young pupils frequently tend to take their teacher as an example
37
See Appendix. Grundgesctz [Constitution] [GG] Article 7 (3).
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See Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Highest Administrative Court] [BVerwGE] 17, 17. 267 (1964).
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and try to imitate him/ ^ The courts found that the guiding principles of the Bhagwan
sect itself stated that the dress was not only worn for religious reasons, but also in order
to attract people towards the sect and to proselytize them/46 Moreover, the Bhagwan sect
did not mandate the wearing of the dress but made it voluntary: The main purpose for
wearing the Bhagwan dress is that its simplicity creates less distraction for the followers
and thus makes it easier for them to meditate/47 The courts reasoned that in class a public
school teacher has to teach and not to mediate, and thus, there is no need for him to wear
the dress while he is teaching/48 These decisions were affirmed by the Highest
Administrative Court two years later in 1988. but the Court added that the decision
whether a teacher should be allowed to wear religious dress depends mainly on the
particular facts, especially the nature of the dress and the impression the dress creates on
outsiders/ Because a uniform and comprehensive solution for this problem is not
possible the question of the constitutionality of a teacher's religious garb remains subject
of much dispute. In Wuppertal, for instance, a Muslim deputy' mistress of a public school
was allowed to wear her religious garb at school, whereas in the same school district, but
in another public school, a Muslin teacher was prohibited to wear her scarf at school by
the school principal.
550
In order to decide about the constitutionality of the wearing of a
religious garb the courts have to balance the free exercise rights of the teacher against the
requirement of neutrality of the public school, by taking into account the specific facts of
45
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the case.
551
For instance, a court must take into account if the guiding principles of the
teacher's religion dictates the wearing of the religious garb as part of the religious
exercise or if the wearing is only voluntarily, as. for example the wearing of a cross is for
most Christians or the wearing of a red dress and the Mala for the followers of Bhagwan.
In addition the courts have to evaluate if the teacher in wearing this religious dress creates
a proselytizing effect on the pupil.
55
' The Bhagwan dress, for example, is considered to
be much more proselytizing that the wearing of a Muslim scarf. 553
In 1 998 the denial of the employment of a Muslim elementary teacher who refused to
teach without her scarf gained much attention. 554 The government of Baden-Wiirttemberg
based its decision on the conclusion that the freedom of religion of the children would
supersede the freedom of religion of the teacher. 5 ' The teacher. Fereshta Ludin. has now
filed an action in the Administrative Court of Stuttgart, but no decision has been
rendered. Because this area is very fact-sensitive and the courts have to balance the
constitutional rights at issue on a case by case basis, it is very difficult to predict the
outcome of this case. In its decision the court will need to consider, for example, how
long and how extensively the children are exposed to the religious garb, if Fereshta Ludin
is wearing the religious garb solely for religious reasons, and how she might explain the
reasons for her appearance to the children.
In conclusion, as in the United States, the German cases that deal with whether a
teacher is allowed to wear a religious garb are fact-sensitive and often difficult. The
courts need to take into account the teacher's free exercise right, the free exercise rights
of the students and the principle of neutrality that requires the public schools to "remain
551
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open to . . . ideological and religious ideas and values,"556 and to not proselytize the
pupil. Because the operation of these factors differs from case to case, a general principle
has never been established as to whether the wearing of a religious garb by a public
school teacher is constitutional. Instead, decisions in this area are rendered on a case by
case basis.
So Kommers. supra note 224. at 477 (citing a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court.).
V. CONCLUSION.
Even though there is a fundamental difference in the relationship between church and
state in Germany and the United States, the treatment of religion in public schools is in
many ways similar in both countries. Both the United States and Germany do not permit
public schools to have a proselytizing effect on the students. They also do not permit
schools to identify themselves with a certain religious belief and, as a consequence, lose
their neutrality." Hence, the German Crucifix case and Stone v. Graham reached a
similar outcome insofar as they both prohibited the display of a religious symbol if the
display creates the impression that the public school identifies itself with a particular
religion. The main difference between the two decisions, was that the United States
Supreme Court held that such an identification of the school with a certain religion would
create an impermissible establishment of religion, whereas the German Federal
Constitutional Court considered the mandatory display of the cross to violate the general
principle of governmental neutrality. This German principle of religious neutrality is in
some aspects broader and in some aspects more narrow than the American non-
establishment principle. Unlike the American non-establishment principle, the German
neutrality concept embraces not only neutrality towards any religious belief, but also
neutrality towards any ideological belief. It is therefore wider in its application than the
American principle. On the other hand, the principle of neutrality does not hinder the
government's ability to favor or accommodate religion unless the government only favors
a particular religion. The German government may, for instance, favor religion by
'
7
The only exemption to this principle of public school neutrality towards religion is the German denominational
public school. Todav. this school type, however, is very rare in Germany. Most of the German Lander have replaced it
by interdenominational or non-denominational public schools, which have to be neutral towards religion.
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providing subsidies to the religious communities,558 whereas such government subsidies
to religious organizations would be an impermissible violation of the American non-
establishment principle. As a consequence, the German neutrality concept allows a
certain degree of accommodation of religious activities in public schools which is
impermissible in the United States.
The use of voluntary school prayer and the giving of religious instruction on a
voluntary basis are examples of the types of religious accommodation in public schools
that is common in Germany but unconstitutional in the United States. However, the
German principle of neutrality towards religion also puts some restraint on the
government that has to be acknowledged. Under no circumstances are school authorities
or teachers allowed to influence students in a proselytizing manner. Thus, as we have
seen, a statute that requires that each public school classroom have a cross on the wall is
considered to have an impermissible proselytizing effect on children. Such religious
exercise is therefore unconstitutional not only in the United States, but also in Germany.
The main reason for the different relationship between church and state in the two
countries can be seen in the historical development of each country. Many of the citizens
of colonial America had left their native countries because of religious persecution.
Nevertheless, many of these colonists favored the establishment of an official religion.
Religion played an important part in the civil and political life of the colonists and by the
time of the American revolution, ten of the thirteen colonies had established official
churches.
560 As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in 1830. religion also played a major role
558
See Appendix. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 140 and Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution of
1919][WRV] art. 138. See also Maunz/Durig, supra note 242. Article 140 at 64-65 (providing more detail about the
possibility of subsidies and financial contributions to the religious communities.).
59
See Church and State in American History xv (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman. eds. 2d ed.,
1987)( pointing out that even though many of the colonists officially were against the establishment of religion, they
nevertheless took certain types of establishment for granted).
Sb0
See Stephen B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality ofCeremonial Deism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2083, 2099
( 1996) (providing a very good historical overview over the role of religion in early American history).
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in school education because every child was "taught the doctrines and the evidences of
his religion, the history of his country, and the leading features of its constitution.'061
At the end of the Civil War. however, it became clear that the diversity of religious
beliefs in the United States would make a close connection between church and state
almost impossible, and by the beginning of the 20th century the need for independence of
church and state was widely recognized all over the United States. 56^ As a result, the
"wall of separation" approach - which was expressly embraced by the Court in Everson -
has commanded much support for more than 50 years. 563
In Germany, on the other hand, the relationship between church and state developed
in a different way. Just like in the United States religious toleration was not a common
feature in the historical development of Germany. The citizens of German states
frequently had to follow the religious belief of their sovereigns/64 Moreover, religious
toleration and the separation of church and state did not take hold in Germany until the
enactment of the Weimar Constitution in 1919. Unlike the United States Constitution, the
Weimar Constitution did not mandate a total separation of church and state, but
connected the two institutions in a unique way. 565 Even though the head of state was no
longer a dignitary of the church, the church retained some privileges and the state could
exercise supervision over some clerical matters. The German relationship between church
and state under the Weimar Constitution could best be described as a system of
cooperation, and religion remained at that time a part of the public school life in the
forms of religious instruction and daily prayer. 566
561
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. Chapter XII. pp. 198 (1954).
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See Church and State in American History, supra note 559. at 121-22. 161-62.
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It is. however, sometimes argued that the Iramers of the Constitution did not intend this separation to be as strict as
it is seen today. See Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. I, 53-66 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); CHURCH AND State
in American History . supra note 539. at 3-47; William J. Murray, Let Us Pray 53-81 (1995) (providing a
historical analysis of the Framer's intent in the establishment clause).
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See supra Part III.B.3.a. for a more details about the historical development of the church state relationship in
Germany.
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See supra Part II I.A.I.
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See Ernst Christian Helmreich. Religious Education in German Schools 53-79 (1959).
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At the beginning of the National Socialism era. in 1933. Hitler proclaimed his
affiliation with the Christian faith and promised to "establish a German Reich built on a
Christian basis and supported by ethical and moral force.'067 Especially in the
educational sector Hitler stated that he would "allow and secure to the Christian
Confessions the influence which is their due in both the school and in education.
'"
These statements led both main churches - the Lutheran-Protestant church and Roman
Catholic church - to "initially welcome" and support "the advent of the Third Reich.""
Very soon after the Nazis' seizure of power, however, both churches came to realize that
Hitler did not intend to favor the Protestant or the Roman Catholic church, but rather to
establish a new kind of Christian religion tied to the Nazi regime. 57 ' The only purpose of
this type of Christian religion was to provide spiritual support for National Socialism.
Under the pretense of freeing the state from harmful church interference, the Nazis
started to narrow the role of the churches and of religion in public life.
371
In all public
buildings, such as courtrooms and government offices, for example, crosses were
replaced by swasticas. This separation between church and state in favor of an
incorporation of the National Socialist principles into public life became most obvious in
Hitler's reorganization of the school system.
57
" The practice of daily school prayer was
replaced by the Nazi salute and a meditation on a word of the Fiihrer. The number of
religious holidays were cut down, with the result that Reformation Day, All Souls" Day
and Corpus Christi Day were no longer recognized as national holidays. Both the
curriculum of religious instruction and the teacher who would offer that religious
567
Frederic Spotts. The Churches and Politics in Germany 27 ( 1 973).
568
Id. at 154.
569
Frederic Spotts, supra note 567, at 7 & 27.
70
Id. at 7 (stating that with Hitler's assistance it was possible "to establish aNazified "German Evengelical Chuch"
with a National Socialist. Ludwig Miiller, as Reich bishop.*').
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von Campenhausen. supra note 249. at 388-89.
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HELMREICH. supra note 566, at 153 & 162-207 (providing detailed information about the reorganization of the
school svstem in the Third Reich).
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instruction were determined by the government.^ 7 Thus, the government and not
religious organizations chose the teacher, who was not a clergy member but a National
Socialist able to teach religion in a way that reconciled it with the Nazi ideology. "Surely
there were many instructors now . . . who taught anything but religion in their classes,
and these teachers often used bible stories as a basis for government propaganda.""
574 The
curriculum was also modified, with the result that the hours of class for religious
instruction were reduced and that religion classes should be taught "during the first or last
period of the morning," which made it more convenient for students who did not take
religion to be excused from these classes. 57
By the time the churches realized that the ideas and goals of the Nazis, such as the
goals reflected in euthanasia and sterilization programs, were contrary to fundamental
religious principles, they had already lost too much of their influence in public life. 576
Thus it was impossible for them to stop the Nazis. Nevertheless, many clergy members of
both churches openly criticized the National Socialists and their ideology as violating
fundamental religious principles. For this criticism many of them faced severe
punishment and persecution by the Nazis: "Altogether during the Third Reich 3,000
pastors were arrested, at least 125 were sent to concentration camps, and 22 are known to
have been executed for their beliefs."
577
Although the churches lost a lot of influence during the National Socialist period,
they regained their power in the aftermath of the war and the occupation era. Being the
only institutions left in Germany after the war, the churches had to organize not only the
religious, but also the political and social life in Germany:
71
Id at 162-209 (providing a very good overview of the role of religion in public schools under National Socialist
rule).
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W. at 185.
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Id. at 172.
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Spotts. supra note 567. at 27.
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Id. at 9.
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In the absence of organized political parties, the churches were simply the
only bodies in a position to address a communication to an Allied authority
and to maintain contacts outside Germany. In towns and villages the pastor,
priest, or both became the social focal point, the person to whom most
people turned for advice, assistance, and leadership. In the chaos following
the collapse, churchmen became civil authorities of great popular influence.
. . .
Until a German government was reestablished in 1949, the churches
constituted the most powerful and articulate voice of the German people." 7
Because of the influence the two main churches had at the time of the framing of the
Basic Law they were successful in insisting on a constitutional protection of their role in
Germany public life. While some of the political parties wanted a broad and
comprehensive constitutional protection of the churches, other political parties opposed a
constitutional regulation of the church-state relationship because of the complexity and
difficulty such a regulation would necessarily bring along. 579 After long discussions in
parliament, a compromise was reached by incorporating into the Basic Law those articles
of the Weimar Constitution which dealt with the relationship between church and state.
In addition, the right of religious instruction was recognized in the Basic Law because of
the negative experiences under the National Socialist regime.
In conclusion, the modern day treatment of religion in public life in Germany and in
the United States, especially in public schools, is mainly based on the history of the
struggle between church and state in both countries. The negative experience of religious
persecution led the United States to embody a strict separation of church and state in the
Constitution, whereas Germany tried to provide compensation for the negative influence
of the Nazi regime on religion by providing for a "special'* church-state-relationship in
the Basic Law. Unlike in the United States, where many believers had experienced
78
Id. at 5 I (providing additional information about the role of the churches in the aftermath of the war and the
Occupation era).
579
von Campenhausen. supra note 249. at 391
.
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religious persecution by other religious groups, in Germany during the Third Reich
believers were persecuted by "non-believers'" because their religious belief endangered
the state's ideology of National Socialism. While in the United States religious
persecution occurred because the government was connected to religion, religious
persecution in Germany occurred under a government that had separated itself completely
from religion. Both countries compensated for that failure of religious protection: The
United States did so by separating church and state, and Germany did so by providing a
closer connection between church and state than was provided for under National
Socialism.
Another cause for the differing treatment of religion in public life in Germany and in
the United States is the variety and structure of religious organizations in both countries.
Due to historical developments, the people of the United States are faced with a variety of
religious beliefs and religious organizations. 580 Aside from the three main confessions.
Protestantism. Judaism and Roman Catholicism, there are many other religious groups,
such as Mormons. Hindus and Moslems.^ 81 The sort of connection between church and
state that exists in Germany would be almost impossible to achieve in such
circumstances. In particular, a "cooperative" approach could lead to much confusion and
administrative effort as government sought to ensure equal government treatment for all
denominations. If, for instance, a country with such a variety of religious beliefs as the
United States adopted the German "cooperative" approach, it would need many more
government employees than the German government currently has in order to ensure the
fair and equal treatment of all religious beliefs by the government. Thus, the
80
See William J. Murray. Let Us Pray 139 (1995) (stating that there are over seven hundred nonconventional
religious denominations).
581
See Church and State in American History, supra note 559 at xviii. See also Philip M. Parker. Religious
Cultures of the World. A statistical reference at 12-20 (1997) (providing a listing of diverse religious groups
and their appearance in the different countries of the world.); J.Gordon Melton, Enclyclopedia of American
RELIGIONS 15-18 (5
th
ed. 1996) (providing agood overview of the different kinds of religions and religious beliefs in
the United States).
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administrative costs for a cooperative relationship between church and state would be
very high in a country with a variety of diverse religious beliefs. Providing religious
instruction in public schools, for example, would be very costly for the government. In
order to ensure the equal accommodation of the different religions, religious instruction
would have to be provided in almost every religious belief and as a result, the
government would have to employ teachers for all these different religion classes. Thus,
the German connection between church and state can only function properly in a country
where religious belief is not as diverse as it is in the United States. In Germany most of
the people are either Protestant or Roman Catholic. 582 Apart from these two major
churches, very few other religious groups can be found in Germany with a membership
that enables them to exercise political influence. It is therefore much easier for the
German government to ensure equal treatment of all religious organizations than it would
be for the United States government. The reality of religious diversity, however, has
slowly begun to surface in Germany in the last couple of decades. People from all over
the world come to Germany seeking asylum and, because they are not predominately
Protestant or Catholic, the religious diversity in Germany has greatly increased over the
past 20 years. Hence, the issue whether Scientology should be accepted as a religious
organization, and the question of whether the state should provide religious instruction
for Muslim school children by a Muslim teacher according to Muslim guidelines, are
both hotly debated issues in Germany today."
-
' 83
It may be only a question of time before
Germany needs to separate the church from the state in a more rigid way in order to
ensure equal treatment of all religious beliefs by the state.
582
See Ernst Christian Helmreich. supra note 566. at 228-29 (providing a table about religious affiliation in
German> in 1951 ): Frederick Spotts. supra note 567. at 221 (providing a table about vocational and confessional
distribution in Germany in 1961).
583 See Dieter Schmidtchen. Markt und Wettbewerb in Gottes Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [FAZ]
November. 1. 1997 at 17 (discussing the Scientology problem): Peter Schurt. Wie verfassungstreu sind Muslime in
Deutschland?', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [FAZ] April 19. 1995 at 10 (discussing the problem of Muslim
religious instruction and the question of who should organize the curriculum).
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In summar\r
, the textual, historical and sociological differences in Germany and the
United States make a different treatment of religion in public schools necessary in some
cases, like for example cases concerning voluntary school prayer. Both systems, however,
ensure that public school education has no proselytizing effect on the children. Because
teachers are not allowed to influence their pupils, the right to proselytize children is in
both countries left to the parents and the religious organizations. Also public schools
have to be neutral towards religion in both countries. However, unlike public schools in
the United States. German public schools have to provide religious instruction. In
addition, they may include religion also in the secular education by referring to it as an
important factor in the historical development of Germany. This is why in German public
school classrooms the posting of a cross is generally allowed unless somebody objects to
it. In the United States, a statute requiring the posting of religious symbols in public
schools would be prohibited by the First Amendment, even if it contained the sort of opt-
out feature the new Bavarian law contains. The differences in the legal treatment of
religion in public school becomes therefore most obvious in cases in which the
government initiates the introduction of religion into the public school life by, for
example, posting religious symbols or providing for school prayer. This, however, does
not mean that both countries differ significantly concerning the treatment of these
religious issues in reality. In fact, some public schools in the United States still have the
Ten Commandments posted on the classroom wall or have prayers at graduation
ceremonies, because no one objects to these practices or files a constitutional claim
against the local school board to seek a prohibition. Moreover, "[ojpinion polls show that
a majority of American Citizens believe that their children should have the right to pray
in school.
"° 84
Other schools, however, have come to the conclusion that any form of
religious expression is forbidden in public schools. This has led to the enactment of strict
William J. Murray. Let Us Pray xvii (1995).
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school policies prohibiting, for example, students from singing religious songs in school
or to gather by themselves for a voluntary prayer. 58 " In order to clarify the issue of
allowed and prohibited religious acts in public schools guidelines were suggested by
President Clinton, the American Civil Liberties Union and many other public policy
CO/1
groups. These guidelines, however, are not binding and only suggest how the school
boards, principals and teachers should handle certain religious issues that arise in public
schools. Thus, the treatment of religion in public schools still differs from school district
to school district.
Which one of the two countries provides a better approach to protect religious
freedom in public schools? After having compared the German and the American
approach to religion in the public school system, this is the final question that arises. Both
countries have established a public school system that tries to give maximum protection
to the student's freedom of religion. The teacher's freedom of religion can be limited in
order to protect both the student's religious freedom and the state's interest in public
school education. 5 8 With respect to the protection of free exercise rights of public school
teachers, both countries therefore provide a similar protection: Both countries require
their teachers to teach in a neutral way without proselytizing. 58 ^ The right of the teacher
to refrain from teaching secular subjects that conflict with his religious beliefs, as well as
his right to wear a religious garb in class, is decided on a case by case basis in both
countries.
On the other hand, the two countries differ greatly concerning the issue of possible
accommodation of religion in public schools. While Germany allows accommodation of
585
Id. at 133-140 (citing additional examples).
86 La Morte, supra note 321. at 67 (providing also an overview of the content of these guidelines).
87 A very popular example for this different treatment of religion can also be seen in the hotly debated school voucher
programs that some states provide for their citizens. See e.g., Harlan Loeb & Debbie kaminer. God. Money, and
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religion to a certain degree, the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution
mainly hinders such an accommodation of religion in public schools. In Germany it is,
under certain circumstances,' 9 ' possible to have a school prayer and a cross in the
classroom whereas in the United States such practices would be a violation of the
Establishment Clause. Hence, in this particular area, the approach of the United States
seems to provide a clearer and more reliable protection of religious freedom in public
schools than does the German system. Because the German system allows the
accommodation of religion in public schools to a certain degree. German courts very
often have to draw the line between permissible accommodation and impermissible
violation of the principle of neutrality towards religion. As we have seen in the Crucifix
case, the outcome in these cases often depends on only a few criteria, and a minimal
factual change may lead to a different outcome. The Federal Constitutional Court
invalidated a Bavarian law because it mandated the display of a cross in each public
school classroom, without any exemptions. Four years later the Highest Administrative
Court of Germany upheld a new Bavarian law that also mandated the display of a cross
but. unlike the old law. provided an exemption from the mandatory display. Hence a
relatively small detail, namely the inclusion of a possible exemption in the statute, made
an enormous difference in the outcome of the case. In the United States even this small
change would not have changed the outcome: The law requiring the posting of a cross
would still have been held unconstitutional. 591 But does the United States system really
provide a clearer and more reliable approach? If we only consider this question from a
legal point of view, perhaps, but, as already stated above, the reality in the United States
is different. As the present-day debate about school voucher programs shows, there is
>0
The posting of a cross and the school prayer are only constitutional if they do not unduly infringe on the religious
rights of the objecting students. Therefore it must be provided that in case of objection the cross must be removed and
that the student does not have to participate in the prayer. See supra IV. B. 2. and C.2.
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Stern zum 65. Geburtstag. 927. 931 (Joachim Burmeisteret al. eds.. 1997).
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actually a lot of uncertainty about how far religious accommodation in school education
is possible." ~ Religious symbols, like the Ten Commandments, although unconstitutional
can be found in public school rooms whereas in other schools it is prohibited for students
to gather voluntarily for prayer. Of course, in Germany as well the reality differs from the
legal point of view. Children, for example, who do not want to participate in religious
instruction are not so easily excused from that subject if there is no alternative class, like
ethics, offered for them. If there is no obligation for the student to participate in an
alternative class, many students will ask to be excused from religious instruction simply
to have fewer classes and more leisure time.
In summary, in both countries the legal treatment of religion in public schools differs
from the actual relationship between religion and public schools. As long as no one
openly objects or files an action against a certain religious practice, the school boards and
school officials determine the actual role of religion in public schools. Nevertheless, by
providing a possibility to challenge governmental actions in court based on a
constitutional violation, both countries have given more protection to the freedom of
religion than many other countries, like China or Iraq, where religious persecution is still
not unusual/9 By giving the individual the possibility to judicially challenge
governmental acts, both countries clearly do not only state "empty" principles in their
constitutions, but grant enforceable rights to their citizens, and thus making both
countries modern constitutional states. Even if the judicial protection may not be a
perfect one. because of the difficulties concerning constitutional litigation in both
countries, if somebody is willing to challenge a religious practice in public schools, he
will be able to do so. Thus, as long as at least the courts remain independent from church
9: See e.g., Harlan Loeb & Debbie Kaminer. God. Money, and School: Voucher Programs impugn the Separation of
Chuch and State. 30 J. Marshall L.Rev. 1 (1996): Suzanne Bauknight. The Search for Constitutional School Choice.
27 J.L.&Educ. 525(1998).
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See Peter Gruber. Religionsfreiheit. Focus. December 15. 1998 at 246-249.
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interference, both states provide a meaningful protection of the freedom of religion in
public schools.
APPENDIX: EXTRACT FROM THE GERMAN BASIC LAW.
PREAMBLE
Conscious of their responsibility before God and humankind, animated by the resolve
to serve world peace as an equal part of a united Europe, the German people have
adopted by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law.
The Germans in the Lander of Baden-Wurttemberg. Bavaria. Berlin. Brandenburg,
Bremen. Hamburg, Hesse. Lower Saxony. Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North
Rhine/Westphalia. Rhineland-Palatinate. Saarland, Saxony. Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-
Holstein and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-
determination. This Basic Law is thus valid for the whole German Nation.
Article 1 |Protection of human dignity!
(1) The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all
public authority.
(2) The German people therefore uphold human rights as inviolable and inalienable and
as the basis of every community, of peace and justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as
directly enforceable law.
Article 2 [Personal Freedom]
(1) Everybody has the right to self-fulfilment in so far as they do not violate the rights of
others or offend against the constitutional order or morality.
1
Extract from the Basic Law for THE FEDERAL Republic OF Germany (Press and Information Office of
the Federal Government, ed. 1998) [Official translation]
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Article 4: [Freedom of faith, conscience and creed]
(1) Freedom of faith and conscience as well as freedom of creed, religious or ideological,
are inviolable.
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.
(3) Nobody may be forced against their conscience into military service involving armed
combat. Details shall be the subject of a federal law.
Article 6: [Marriage and family, children born outside marriage]
(1) Marriage and family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.
(2) The care and upbringing of children are a natural right of parents and a duty primarily
incumbent on them. It is the responsibility of the community to ensure that they
perform this duty.
Article 7 [School education]
(1
)
The entire school system shall be under the supervision of the state.
(2) Parents and guardians have the right to decide whether children receive religious
instruction.
(3) Religious instruction shall form part of the curriculum in state schools except non-
denominational schools. Without prejudice to the state's right of supervision,
religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the doctrine of the religious
community concerned. Teachers may not be obliged to give religious instruction
against their will.
(4) The right to establish private schools shall be guaranteed. Private schools as
alternatives to state schools shall require the approval of the state and be subject to
Land legislation. Such approval shall be given where private schools are not inferior
to state schools in terms of their educational aims, their facilities and the training of
their teaching staff and where it does not encourage segregation of pupils according to
113
the means of their parents. Approval shall be withheld where the economic and legal
status of the teaching staff is not adequately secured.
(5) A private elementary school shall be approved only where the education authority
finds that it meets a special educational need or where, at the request of parents or
guardians, it is to be established as a non-denominational, denominational or
alternative school and no state elementary school of that type exists locally.
(6) Preparatory schools shall remain abolished.
Article 19 [Restriction of basic rights]
(1 ) In so far as a basic right may. under this Basic Law, be restricted by or pursuant to a
law the law shall apply generally and not merely to one case. Furthermore, the law-
shall specify the basic right and relevant Article.
(2) In no case may the essence of a basic right be encroached upon.
(3) The basic right shall also apply to domestic legal persons to the extent that the nature
of such rights permits.
(4) Where rights are violated by public authority the person affected shall have recourse
to law. In so far as no other jurisdiction has been established such recourse shall be
the ordinary courts. The second sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 10 shall not be
affected by the provisions of this article.
Article 20 [Political and social structure, defense of the constitutional order)
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany shall be a democratic and social federal state.
(2) All public authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised by the people
through elections and referendums and by specific legislative, executive and judicial
bodies.
(3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the
judiciary by law and justice.
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(4) All Germans have the right to resist anybody attempting to do away with this
constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible.
Article 33 [Equal civil status, professional civil service]
(1) All Germans in every Land have the same civil rights and duties.
(2) All Germans are equally eligible for any public office according to their aptitude,
qualifications and professional ability.
(3) The enjoyment of civil rights, eligibility for public office, and rights acquired in the
public service shall not depend on a person's religious denomination. Nobody may
suffer disadvantage by reason of their adherence or non-adherence to a denomination
or their other convictions.
Article 56 |Oath of officej
On taking office the Federal President shall answer the following oath before the
assembled Members of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat:
"I swear that I will dedicate my efforts to the well-being of the German
people, enhance their benefits, save them from harm, uphold and defend the
Basic Law and the laws of the Federation, perform my duties conscientiously,
and do justice to all. So help me God."
The oath can be sworn without the religious affirmation.
Article 64 [Appointment of Federal Ministers]
(2) On taking office the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministers shall swear before
the Bundestag the oath provided in Article 56.
Article 79 [Amendments to the Basic Law)
(2) Such law must be carried by two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag and two
thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat.
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(3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Lander,
their participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Article 1
and 20 shall be prohibited.
Article 140 [Rights of religious communities]
The provisions of Articles 136. 137. 138. 139 and 141 of the German Constitution of 11
August 1919 shall be integral part of this Basic Law.
Extract from the German Constitution of 11 August 1919 (Weimar Constitution)
Religion and religious communities
Article 136
(1) Civil and political rights and duties shall be neither dependent on nor restricted by the
exercise of religious freedom.
(2) Enjoyment of civil and political rights and eligibility for public office shall be
independent of religious denomination.
(3) Nobody shall be obliged to disclose their religious convictions. The authorities may
not inquire about their membership of a religious community7 except where rights or
duties depend on such information or a statutory7 statistical survey makes such enquiry
necessary.
(4) Nobody may be compelled to perform any religious act or ceremony or to participate
in religious practices or to use a religious form of oath.
Article 137
(1) There shall be no state church.
(2) Freedom to form religious communities shall be guaranteed. The uniting of religious
communities within the territory of the Reich shall not be subject to any restrictions.
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(3) Every religious community shall regulate and administer its affairs independently
within the limits of the law valid for all. It shall confer its offices without the
participation of the state or the civil community.
(4) Religious communities shall acquire legal capacity according to the general
provisions of civil law.
(5) Religious communities shall remain public corporations if they have enjoyed that
status hitherto. Other religious communities shall be granted like rights upon
application where their constitution and the number of their members offer an
assurance of their permanency. Where several such public religious communities
form one organization it too shall be a public corporation.
(6) Religious that are public corporations shall be entitled to levy taxes in accordance
with Land law on the basis of the civil taxation list.
(7) Associations which foster non-religious belief shall have the same status as religious
communities.
(8) Any further legislation as may be required for the implementation of these provisions
shall lie within the jurisdiction of the Lander.
Article 138
( 1
)
State contributions to religious communities based on law or contract or special legal
titles shall be redeemed by means of the Land legislation. The principles for such
redemption shall be established by the Reich.
(2) The right to own property and other rights of religious communities or associations in
respect to their institutions, foundations and other assets intended for purposes of
worship, education or charity shall be guaranteed.
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Article 139
Sundays and feast-days recognized by the state shall remain legally protected as days of
rest from work and of spiritual edification.
Article 141
To the extent that there exists a need for religious service and pastoral work in the army,
hospitals, prisons or other public institutions, the religious communities shall be
permitted but in no way compelled to perform religious acts.
